Introduction

Cole argues that understanding past thinkers requires situating them within their historical environment rather than viewing their ideas in isolation. Great men are always children of their age, constrained by the habits of thought and traditional forms available to them, even when they are most innovative.

Cole observes that Rousseau has suffered from critics lacking historical imagination, leading to oversimplified assessments that accept or reject his entire political doctrine wholesale based on partisan bias rather than careful analysis.

Cole identifies that Rousseau's works are important both as historical documents revealing the eighteenth-century mind and as influential texts that shaped European intellectual history, particularly in Romanticism, education, and political philosophy.

Cole notes that while the French Revolution's leaders were profoundly influenced by Rousseau's works, later audiences often cited him without truly understanding him, treating the Social Contract as either a revolutionary weapon or as a partisan talking point rather than engaging with it as serious political philosophy.

Cole argues that the Social Contract deserves study as a work of permanent philosophical value rather than merely as a historical document or partisan weapon, and this philosophical approach still requires careful historical understanding of its limitations and context.

Cole explains that Rousseau wrote under the constraints of an absolutist monarchy and aristocracy, which forced him to generalize rather than attack particular abuses. His theoretical abstraction, while sometimes excessive, reflects the historical necessity of the era and allowed his generalizations to carry revolutionary implications.

Cole refutes the charge that Rousseau was unoriginal by arguing that his importance consists in the new use he makes of old Social Contract theory ideas, which he transforms and develops rather than merely borrowing. True theoretical progress comes through the adjustment of inherited concepts, not isolation.

Cole assesses Rousseau's First Discourse as a weak rhetorical exercise lacking logical rigor, yet historically significant as the work that established Rousseau's fame and reveals the seeds of his later political thought, particularly the ideal of 'nature' as a standard of judgment.

Cole argues that the Discourse on Inequality represents a significant advance in Rousseau's thought, moving beyond simple rejection of society to offer rational justification for his views and a developed conception of natural man as an abstraction for theoretical purposes, not historical fact.

Cole defends Rousseau against criticism that his method is historically false, noting that Rousseau himself explicitly rejects presenting the state of nature as historical fact and instead uses it as an ideal conceptual tool—a legitimate philosophical approach characteristic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Cole identifies the Political Economy as containing the first sketch of Rousseau's crucial doctrine of the General Will, which presents the State as a moral being aimed at the wellbeing of all, and introduces principles of taxation based on the common good.

Cole marks 1762, the year of the Social Contract's publication alongside Émile, as the culmination of Rousseau's career. The Social Contract contains his complete constructive political theory, presenting the principles of political right rather than analyzing existing governments like Montesquieu.

Cole distinguishes between two schools of political theory: one that collects facts to reach generalizations about actual societies, and another that penetrates to universal principles beneath human combination. Rousseau belongs to the philosophical school seeking the principle of political obligation.

Cole explains that Rousseau's fundamental problem is how to find a form of association that defends all members while allowing each person to remain free and obey only himself. This problem of political obligation encompasses all other political problems.

Cole clarifies that Rousseau's opening phrase should be understood as expressing 'man ought to be free' or 'man is born for freedom' in an idealized sense, not as a literal biological claim. The apparent contradiction dissolves when understood as referring to a moral or natural condition.

Cole traces how the contrast between nature and society operates differently across Rousseau's works: in the Discourses it critiques actual societies; in the Social Contract it seeks to justify rational society while remaining free. The concept of nature itself develops from a critique of civilization to an ideal of full human development.

Cole explains that Rousseau's fundamental aim, stated in the Social Contract's opening, is to find sure rules for administration by taking men as they are and considering laws as they should be. This reverses Montesquieu's approach of examining how existing laws shape men.

Cole identifies that Rousseau uses three general conceptions—the Social Contract, Sovereignty, and the General Will—as alternative ways of expressing the same fundamental principles of political union, to be examined in turn.

Cole provides historical context for the Social Contract theory, tracing it from ancient Greek sophists through medieval and Renaissance writers to eighteenth-century use. The theory is adaptable to opposite points of view and exists wherever government is based on some form of consent.

Cole distinguishes two types of Social Contract theories: those based on a contract between people and government (medieval origin) and those based on a contract among individuals composing the State (modern form). Each form admits of opposite interpretations.

Cole traces the first form of contract theory from medieval origins through seventeenth-century English constitutional thinking, where it served as a popular appeal for rights. The theory implies mutual obligations but became increasingly difficult to maintain.

Cole describes the second form of Social Contract theory as originating in Hooker and developing through Hobbes and Locke to Rousseau. This form naturally implies popular sovereignty, though historical theorists including Hobbes have used it to support opposite conclusions.

Cole explains that Hobbes accepts the second form of contract theory but argues the people alienate all rights to a determinate sovereign through the contract, resulting in absolute government power. This logical but extreme position uses the contract theory to support despotism rather than popular liberty.

Cole identifies the logical flaws in Hobbes's theory: it assumes people can alienate not just their own liberty but also their descendants' liberty, a position that both Locke and Rousseau reject as unfounded. Yet the theory has internal consistency and provides important insights.

Cole describes how Locke attempts to counter Hobbes by making government dependent continually on the consent of the governed and holding rulers liable for tyranny. However, Locke provides no machinery for expressing popular opinion short of revolution and treats consent as largely tacit.

Cole explains that Rousseau recognizes the need for mechanisms to express popular consent actively and periodically rather than tacitly. He admires ancient Greek city-states and Swiss free cities but believes representative government cannot adequately realize popular will in nation-states.

Cole argues that despite Rousseau's failure to develop a theory of the modern nation-state, his doctrine of the underlying principle of political obligation—based on the social contract viewed as a living principle—has become foundational for all modern political thought from Kant onwards.

Cole contends that Rousseau's use of the contractual form is due to historical circumstances rather than philosophical necessity, since he clearly does not believe in the historical reality of any actual contract. The form persists because no better terminology has been found for expressing the fundamental basis of political union.

Cole identifies that Rousseau presents his fundamental doctrine in three forms: quasi-historically as the Social Contract, semi-legally as popular Sovereignty, and philosophically as the living rational will of society's members. These are alternative expressions of the same underlying principle.

Cole argues that sovereignty has been confused by mixing the legal concept of a determinate superior with philosophical conceptions of where supreme power should reside. The philosophical sovereign is neither nominal, legal, nor factual, but represents where power ought to be.

Cole explains that the philosophical concept of sovereignty rests on the view that the people, whether it can alienate rights or not, remains the ultimate authority from which there is no appeal. This principle is recognized even by Hobbes, though he then destroys it.

Cole identifies Rousseau's key insight that the supreme power must be distinguished from the government that executes its will. This prevents the Hobbesian conclusion that revolution means return to anarchy, and preserves the people's ultimate authority.

Cole states that in Rousseau's theory, sovereignty cannot be limited, abandoned, shared or destroyed. There must always exist an ultimate court of appeal, and unless sovereignty is clearly separated from government, the government will inevitably be regarded as absolute.

Cole explains that Rousseau adapts the doctrine of separated powers, but substitutes only two powers with one wholly dependent on the other: the legislative (sovereign) power is supreme; the executive is merely derivative; and judicial power is merely a function of government.

Cole clarifies that the division between sovereignty and government is one of will and power: the government executes the will of the sovereign people without abandoning supreme authority. The sovereign can at any moment recall powers delegated to the government.

Cole notes that Rousseau's principle that sovereignty concerns only general matters (affecting the whole community equally) while government handles particular matters is difficult to maintain in practice. Modern legislation necessarily concerns particular classes and interests, effectively concentrating power in the executive.

Cole presents Rousseau's principle that democracy suits small states, aristocracy medium-sized states, and monarchy large states. This principle reflects Rousseau's thinking about city-states and his skepticism regarding representative government in nation-states.

Cole explains Rousseau's rejection of representative government: since sovereignty and will cannot be alienated, no representative assembly can exercise the general will. Cole contextualizes this critique within the eighteenth century but notes that representative government concerns remain valid.

Cole interprets Rousseau's difficult claim that every state needs a Legislator by noting that the legislator represents the spirit of customary institutions. The legislator merely suggests ideas for popular approval, showing that will rather than force is the state's basis.

Cole presents Rousseau's definition of law as acts of the general will, emerging from the state's foundation in contract. Universal justice requires mutual obligation to become effective as law among people.

Cole identifies the General Will as the most crucial yet contested concept in Rousseau's theory. It has been difficult for critics to determine exactly what Rousseau meant and what philosophical value it possesses, partly because Rousseau himself sometimes presented different formulations.

Cole explains that according to Rousseau, the act of association creates a moral and collective body composed of the members, possessing a unified will—the General Will—that forms the rule of justice for all members' relations with each other and the state.

Cole raises the critical question whether Rousseau is right to assume that the general will created by society must always tend to the welfare of the whole, or whether it might be equally fallible and capable of being misled like any individual will.

Cole presents Rousseau's clear answer that the General Will (concerned with common interest) must be distinguished from the Will of All (sum of particular wills pursuing private interests). Individual votes motivated by self-interest are negligible from the perspective of the General Will.

Cole explains Rousseau's claim that even when particular interests encroach upon the General Will, the latter remains unaffected. The problem is that participants may fail to answer the question put to them correctly, substituting private interest for public good.

Cole notes that Rousseau claims majority voting will express the General Will in a city-state where particular associations are avoided and individual self-interest cancels out. However, Cole charges him with pushing the democratic argument too far in believing this mechanism infallible.

Cole presents Rousseau's response to critics asking whether the General Will excludes immoral acts: such acts would only be unanimous selfishness, not part of any General Will. Ignorance without selfish motivation, however, does not make the will anti-social.

Cole acknowledges that Rousseau oscillates between treating the General Will as an ideal conception humans can only approximate and claiming it is actually realized in every republican state. This muddle and fluctuation may reflect Rousseau's own incomplete understanding.

Cole argues that the Discourse on Political Economy's treatment of the General Will is superior to that in the Social Contract itself, offering a lucid exposition of how different associations create general wills for their members but particular wills for the larger society.

Cole clarifies that Rousseau conceives of a hierarchy of general wills: every permanent association has its own general will (general for its members), but these are particular wills relative to larger associations. The state's General Will is the supreme general will.

Cole explains that Rousseau conceives the state as a fully developed moral and collective being with a common will. Relative to entities outside itself, the state is a simple being or individual, just as the state's General Will can be part of a larger federation's general will.

Cole notes that Rousseau vacillates between regarding the General Will as a purely ideal conception that institutions approximate and treating it as actually realized in every republican state. This oscillation appears in his treatment of whether majority votes necessarily express the General Will.

Cole argues that democracy's justification lies not in being always right but in being more general—more likely to express the common interest—than rule by any selected class prone to corporate interests.

Cole identifies that the General Will's basic meaning is the application of human freedom to political institutions. It rests on Rousseau's view that humans are free agents capable of universal law that they prescribe to themselves.

Cole identifies that the General Will is essentially one with Kant's doctrine of the autonomy of the will in ethics. Rousseau perceived the applicability of his principles to both politics and ethics, unifying political and moral philosophy.

Cole presents Rousseau's view that moral liberty arises when we obey a law we prescribe to ourselves rather than following appetite. This principle unifies individual and political freedom: acts are moral and free when guided by universal law.

Cole explains that for Rousseau, man achieves true freedom when his whole being is unified in pursuit of a rational end—a universal law that excludes contradiction. Selfish passions fragment the will and produce heteronomy (external governance), whereas universal law creates autonomy.

Cole clarifies that the Real Will (or General Will) is not primarily a political doctrine transferred to ethics but is rooted in Rousseau's fundamental view of human freedom operative in both domains. The general principle of autonomy applies universally.

Cole presents the central criticism that Rousseau's theory secures freedom for the state as a whole but not necessarily individual freedom. A free state might be tyrannical; a despot might grant personal freedoms. What guarantees that state freedom won't enslave members?

Cole explains Rousseau's argument that limits on state power create internal conflict without a common superior. If individuals retained certain rights, they would each be their own judge, perpetuating the state of nature within society.

Cole clarifies that Rousseau's absolute state power and his limits on state authority involve no contradiction. The state has a right to intervene wherever proper but has no moral right where intervention is harmful, even though it has legal right to do so.

Cole acknowledges the criticism that allowing the sovereign to judge what serves its interests creates a risk of state tyranny. However, Rousseau's answer follows from his rejection of limited sovereignty: some judge must exist, and the people are the best available.

Cole argues that liberty is not merely freedom from restraint but freedom secured by reasonable state interference. The state can make members more free when restraining mutual damage than when leaving any one free to enslave another.

Cole responds to the claim that if all rights are alienated in the contract, the rights of man become meaningless. He argues the revolutionary conception of natural rights was freedom itself, which remains inalienable and indestructible despite the contract.

Cole defends Rousseau against the charge that he illegitimately identifies individual interests with collective interests. Rousseau explicitly acknowledges opposition between particular interests and the General Will but argues the real interests of all align when both follow universal law.

Cole concludes that Rousseau's theory of liberty returns to the fundamental principle that the real will in state and individual is omnipotent. This is the significance underlying the paradoxical phrase 'forced to be free'.

Cole explains that Rousseau's phrase about being 'forced to be free' means that the General Will constrains individuals toward their true rational interests, just as higher rational will might constrain lower nature in the individual.

Cole argues that the crucial insight is recognizing the state as a moral being with powers of determination similar to individual minds. This is where the General Will's philosophical significance ultimately resides.

Cole acknowledges critics who claim the General Will is a mere abstraction if it cannot be arrived at by voting, but he argues that precisely this abstract character—as an ideal toward which actual states approximate—is what gives the conception its philosophical value.

Cole explains that the General Will represents a search for society's universal principles, not for something wholly actualized in any state. This universal principle, though imperfectly realized, exists to some degree in every legitimate state.

Cole restates the fundamental insight of the Social Contract theory: that legitimate society exists by people's consent and acts by their will, not force. This principle addresses the deep human interdependence underlying society.

Cole presents Rousseau's answer to why one should obey the General Will: it exists within oneself, not externally imposed. One thereby obeys only oneself, as the state is a natural extension of personality rather than mere accident.

Cole notes that while the General Will exists in principle in all states, the practical problem is activating it in formal political institutions. It operates at different degrees in various aspects of society, from parliaments to intimate relationships.

Cole specifies that while the General Will operates throughout society, political theory must focus on securing its supremacy in the nation's official institutions and public councils, where Rousseau primarily directed his efforts.

Cole emphasizes that the General Will requires not only good government but self-government—not merely rational conduct but the community's willing commitment to it. The General Will must be both universal in object and widely held.

Cole stresses that there is no General Will unless the people themselves will the good. While general will might be embodied in one person willing universally, in the state it requires the mass of citizens willing it.

Cole characterizes the General Will as a universal, rational will in the Kantian sense. While Rousseau finds its sanction in human feeling rather than pure reason, the General Will itself remains essentially rational.

Cole identifies an important difference: whereas Kant's moral imperative is purely rational, Rousseau grounds the sanction of the General Will in human feeling and natural goodness. Both agree on the essential nature of universal will.

Cole quotes from Rousseau's original draft to show that he conceived the General Will as a pure rational act, not a passion-driven will. It represents what a man may demand of his neighbor and what neighbors may rightfully demand.

Cole explains Rousseau's view that natural law, though rationally knowable, requires an emotional foundation to guide most of humanity's actions. This law is graven on the human heart in characters that cannot be erased.

Cole explains Rousseau's distinction in the Discourse on Inequality: natural self-respect is the desire to be treated as equal among others and includes benevolence. Egoism, loving oneself at others' expense, is an unnatural perversion.

Cole identifies that Rousseau's fundamental belief in natural human goodness underlies his political, educational, religious, and ethical ideas. Though not directly stated in the Social Contract, this principle animates all of Rousseau's systematic thought.

Cole notes that Rousseau's political, educational, religious, and ethical ideas are all animated by a single consistent attitude about human nature. Understanding his complete system requires integrating the Social Contract with Émile and other works.

Cole concludes that the Social Contract stands as the superior text in political philosophy, and Rousseau's influence continues to grow. Future political philosophy will be rooted in his conceptions, which will be taken up and transformed by new generations.

Cole predicts that Rousseau's influence is not diminishing but growing as new generations encounter his work. His hazy but valuable conceptions will form the basis for future political philosophy, which will both recover his insights and transform them.