A Discourse on Political Economy

Rousseau announces this treatise is part of a larger work he abandoned, and this extract represents the most considerable and worthy fragment for publication.

Rousseau commits to investigating legitimate rule of administration by uniting what right sanctions with what interest prescribes, ensuring justice and utility are not divided.

Rousseau explains that being a citizen of a free state and member of the sovereign gives him both right and duty to study political affairs.

Rousseau opens with the famous paradox that man is born free yet everywhere in chains, and poses the central question of what can make this legitimate.

Rousseau argues that force alone cannot ground legitimate authority; the social order rests on conventions, not natural force, and requires separate justification.

Rousseau establishes that the family, based on natural need, dissolves when need ceases, after which family unity rests only on convention and voluntary association.

Rousseau identifies self-preservation and personal judgment as natural to man from the age of discretion, making him his own master.

Rousseau compares family structure to political society, where free and equal individuals alienate liberty only for their own advantage, differing from family only in the ruler's motivation.

Rousseau critiques Grotius for using fact to establish right and for suggesting some men naturally rule others as shepherds rule cattle.

Rousseau argues that Aristotle's claim that some are born for slavery is backwards; slaves are made by force, not born to servitude.

Rousseau sarcastically rejects legendary accounts of Adam and Noah as founders of monarchies, showing how monarchical claims based on such origins are absurd.

Rousseau identifies the 'right of the strongest' as a fundamental principle stated ironically, presenting the puzzle of how force can create moral obligation.

Rousseau argues force is merely physical power without moral effect; yielding to force is necessity, not duty, so force creates no right.

Rousseau demonstrates that if force creates right, then right changes with every shift in power, making the concept incoherent and meaningless.

Rousseau uses the example of a brigand's pistol to show that invoking divine sanction for force-based authority is circular reasoning.

Rousseau concludes that force does not create right, and therefore only legitimate powers merit obedience, returning to his original question.

Rousseau establishes that since no man has natural authority and force creates no right, legitimate authority must be founded on conventions.

Rousseau presents Grotius's argument that if an individual can enslave himself, so can a people, then deconstructs it by questioning what the people gains.

Rousseau questions whether civil tranquility under despotism is beneficial when the despot's ambition and avarice impose greater hardship than internal dissension.

Rousseau argues that an act of total self-alienation is absurd and null because only someone out of mind would perform it; a people cannot perform it either.

Rousseau argues that even if an adult could alienate himself, parents cannot irrevocably alienate their children's liberty, which is contrary to nature.

Rousseau declares that renouncing liberty means renouncing humanity itself and all moral capacity, making such renunciation incompatible with human nature.

Rousseau shows that a contract establishing absolute authority on one side and unlimited obedience on the other is contradictory and void.

Rousseau rejects the argument that war gives victors right to enslave conquered; this conflates the right to kill with the right to enslave.

Rousseau defines war as a relation between states, not between individuals, and argues that individuals are enemies only accidentally as soldiers.

Rousseau argues that just principles of war respect individual lives once they surrender, differentiating his view from Grotius's.

Rousseau concludes that the right of conquest has no foundation if war does not grant the right to massacre or enslave the conquered.

Rousseau argues that a slave made in war has no obligation to obey beyond what force compels, as the state of war continues.

Rousseau concludes that slavery is null and void because the words 'slave' and 'right' are mutually exclusive and contradictory.

Rousseau distinguishes between mere aggregation of enslaved individuals and true society; a master with slaves creates no body politic or common good.

Rousseau argues that Grotius contradicts himself by assuming a people exists to give itself; the act of becoming a people must logically precede the act of giving.

Rousseau argues that without prior convention establishing majority rule, no obligation binds minorities; unanimous agreement must precede majority voting.

Rousseau states the condition where state of nature becomes unsustainable and describes the fundamental problem the social contract must solve.

Rousseau explains that men can only preserve themselves by uniting and directing their existing forces through aggregation.

Rousseau formulates the central problem: how can individuals pledge their force and liberty without harming their own interests?

Rousseau states the essential problem: find an association that protects all while allowing each to obey only himself and remain free.

Rousseau argues that the clauses of the social contract are determined by the nature of the act itself and cannot be modified without becoming vain.

Rousseau identifies the essential clause: total alienation of each associate with all rights to the whole community ensures equal conditions.

Rousseau argues that without complete alienation, the union is imperfect and the state of nature would continue or tyranny would result.

Rousseau paradoxically argues that giving oneself to all means giving to no one in particular, and one gains equivalence for everything lost.

Rousseau formulates the core of the social contract: putting person and power under the supreme direction of the general will.

Rousseau explains how the social contract creates a moral body with unity, identity, life, and will from the union of all persons.

Rousseau defines terminology: the public person is called city or republic; its members are called people when united, citizens when sharing sovereignty.

Rousseau explains that the social contract comprises mutual undertaking where each member has a double capacity toward sovereign and state.

Rousseau argues that the sovereign cannot bind itself by law because it can only regard itself in one capacity; no fundamental law can bind the people.

Rousseau maintains that the sovereign, drawing being from the contract, cannot bind itself to anything derogatory to the original act.

Rousseau argues that once the multitude unites in one body, offending any member offends all, obligating mutual help.

Rousseau claims the sovereign, formed of individuals, has no interest contrary to theirs and cannot wish to hurt its members.

Rousseau notes that while the sovereign cannot hurt subjects, subjects may have particular will contrary to general will and need security.

Rousseau explains how individuals with particular interests may view social obligations as gratuitous and resist while enjoying rights.

Rousseau argues that the social compact implicitly includes forcing those who refuse the general will to obey, making them 'forced to be free.'

Rousseau describes how the social contract substitutes justice for instinct and morality for natural impulses in human conduct.

Rousseau balances what man loses (natural liberty and unlimited rights) against gains (civil liberty and property rights).

Rousseau adds that moral liberty, from obedience to self-prescribed law, makes man truly master of himself.

Rousseau explains how when individuals give themselves to community, their goods become community property under the social contract.

Rousseau argues that the right of first occupancy requires conditions: land not inhabited, occupation only of needed amount, possession through labor.

Rousseau questions how first occupancy can justify unlimited territorial claims, using the example of Nuñez Balbao's seizure of South America.

Rousseau traces how individual lands became public territory and sovereignty extended from personal rule to territorial rule.

Rousseau paradoxically argues that alienation to community transforms usurpation into right and ensures legitimate property.

Rousseau concludes that the compact replaces physical inequality with moral and legal equality based on convention and right.

Rousseau establishes that sovereignty is the exercise of the general will and is exercised according to the common good.

Rousseau argues that sovereignty, being the exercise of general will, cannot be alienated and the sovereign cannot be truly represented.

Rousseau explains that particular will, by nature partial, cannot permanently agree with general will, making representation impossible.

Rousseau warns that if people promise simple obedience, it dissolves itself as a people and the sovereign ceases to exist.

Rousseau clarifies that rulers' commands can pass as general will when the sovereign remains free to oppose but does not.