Chapter VIII

Locke establishes that all men are by nature free, equal, and independent, and therefore no one can be subjected to political power without their own consent.

When free men consent together, they form one community or body politic by agreeing to unite for safety, peaceable living, and property security.

Locke argues that a unified body must move as one, requiring the consent of the majority, since unanimous consent to every action is impossible and would make the body politic unable to function.

By consenting to form a political society, each individual tacitly agrees to be bound by the majority's determinations, or else the compact would have no meaning.

Locke refutes the notion that unanimity is required, arguing that practical infirmities and diverse opinions make unanimous consent nearly impossible and would lead to immediate dissolution.

Locke defines the true beginning of lawful government as the consent of free men capable of a majority to unite and incorporate into a political society.

The first objection claims that history provides no examples of independent, equal men meeting together to establish a government.

Locke argues that government predates written records, and the absence of historical accounts of natural state men does not disprove that such origins occurred, comparing it to the lack of records about armies before they were formed.

Locke cites Rome and Venice as clear historical examples where independent men united to form a government without natural superiority or subjection among them.

Locke provides examples from the Americas where people lived without hereditary government and chose leaders by consent, supporting his thesis of consensual government origins.

Locke cites the Spartan example as further evidence of freemen establishing a government by their own consent.

Locke concludes that both reason and historical examples demonstrate that governments begun in peace had their foundation in the consent of the people.

Locke acknowledges that historical records show most early governments were monarchical, but argues this does not contradict the principle of consensual foundation.

Locke explains that early people naturally preferred monarchy because paternal government accustomed them to single rule, and simple societies needed a capable general for defense.

Locke cites American Indian kings as examples whose authority was primarily military, with limited domestic power and decisions on peace and war often made by the people or council.

Locke extensively documents from scripture that the judges and first kings of Israel were chiefly military commanders, not absolute rulers.

Locke argues that whether monarchy arose from family development or from multiple families uniting, it was established by consent for public good, not by natural paternal authority.

Locke observes that in the golden age of government, rulers exercised power for public good without dispute, but when ambition and luxury corrupted leaders, people had to develop checks on power.

Locke concludes that all historically documented peaceful beginnings of government have been laid in the consent of the people.

The second major objection argues that since men are born under existing governments, none can ever be free or at liberty to unite and establish a new government.

Locke argues that the objection's own logic proves it false: if one man born under government can be free to establish a monarchy, all such men must be equally free, making either all men free or all subject to one prince.

Locke argues that mankind has never accepted the idea that birth under government creates natural subjection, as evidenced by the constant historical practice of men withdrawing and establishing new governments.

Locke cites numerous historical examples of men withdrawing from their birth governments and establishing new commonwealths, proving they retained natural freedom despite being born under government.

Locke argues that parental consent cannot bind children to a government; each person upon coming of age is as free as their parent to choose what government to join.

Locke explains that while fathers can attach conditions to inherited property requiring membership in the commonwealth, this is not perpetual subjection but a consequence of property enjoyment.

Locke explains that because commonwealths prevent dismemberment of territory, people assume subjects are born perpetually bound, when actually they give tacit consent when inheriting property.

Locke argues that governments' own practices demonstrate they do not claim power over children based on parental subjection, as shown in naturalization and foreign birth cases.

Locke defines express consent as a clear declaration that makes one a full member of a political society and subject to its government.

Locke defines tacit consent as arising from the possession or enjoyment of any part of a government's dominions, which binds one to obey that government's laws during such enjoyment.

Locke argues that when a person incorporates into a commonwealth, their property becomes part of that commonwealth's dominions and subject to its laws.

Locke explains that tacit consent obligation exists only while one enjoys possessions in a commonwealth, and ends when one quits the property and can then establish a new government elsewhere.

Locke argues that those who give express consent to join a commonwealth are perpetually and indissolubly bound as subjects unless the government is dissolved or they are formally cut off.

Locke distinguishes between merely submitting to laws while residing in a territory and actually becoming a member of the society, arguing that foreigners can do the former without the latter.

Locke concludes that nothing makes a man a member of a commonwealth except his actively entering it by positive engagement and express promise and compact.