Chapter VI

Locke argues that the term 'paternal power' is misleading because it attributes parental authority solely to the father, when in fact both parents have equal claim to it by both reason and scriptural evidence.

Locke contends that had 'parental power' been used instead, it would have been obvious that absolute parental dominion could not apply, since the mother would share in it—thereby undermining arguments for absolute fatherly authority.

Locke distinguishes between different kinds of equality: while age, virtue, and merit may create legitimate precedence, the natural equality he defends concerns jurisdiction and dominion—the right of every person to freedom without subjection to arbitrary authority.

Locke claims that children, though born to equality, are temporarily subject to parental rule in infancy, but this subjection is like swaddling clothes—it loosens with age and reason until the child reaches full freedom.

Locke explains that while Adam was born perfect, his descendants are born weak and helpless; therefore, by the law of nature, parents have an obligation to preserve, nourish, and educate their children as God's creatures, not their own workmanship.

Locke argues that since the law of reason operates only through reason itself, children cannot be under that law until they come to the use of reason; hence infants are not yet bound by it, and parental guidance is necessary until they reach rational maturity.

Locke derives parental power from the duty to care for children in their imperfect state—when a child lacks understanding, the parent who understands must will for him; but once the child reaches maturity, both become equally free.

Locke shows that in both natural law and civil law, a person becomes free when they acquire capacity to know and follow that law; the same principle governs when both father and son are released from tutelage.

Locke acknowledges that those who never attain sufficient reason (lunatics, idiots, madmen) remain under perpetual tuition because they cannot guide themselves by reason and thus never become free.

Locke argues that natural freedom and childhood subjection are consistent because both rest on the same principle: the child exercises freedom through the father's understanding until acquiring his own reason.

Locke notes that commonwealths themselves recognize a threshold age at which men begin acting as free citizens and are not required to take oaths of submission before that time.

Locke asserts that freedom grounded in reason is a privilege of human nature, while premature liberty without reason is brutish abandonment; parental authority is justified to cultivate the reason and character necessary for true freedom.

Locke refutes the claim that parental care justifies absolute dominion, arguing that parental power extends only to disciplining children to develop strength, health, and virtue—and the mother shares equally in this power.

Locke contends that parental power is neither a natural right of begetting nor perpetual; it goes along with nourishment and education and belongs equally to any guardian, whether natural or foster parent.

Locke differentiates the perpetual obligation of children to honor their parents—grounded in gratitude and the law of God—from any claim to command or legal authority over them.

Locke distinguishes the temporary tuitive power during minority (a duty rather than prerogative) from the perpetual right to honor and respect, arguing that confusion of these two has created misconceptions about paternal authority.

Locke explains that the command 'Children obey your parents' applies with decreasing stringency as children mature; a grown man with his own children is not bound to the same submission as a young child.

Locke asserts that the educational power is temporary and transferable (as in apprenticeship), while the duty of honor is perpetual and inalienable; neither gives parental legislative or capital authority.

Locke generalizes that various obligations of honor, respect, defense, and gratitude—including to parents—create no right to make laws over the obligated party.

Locke argues that the survival of parental power in parents who are themselves subjects proves that paternal and political power are separate and distinct, built on different foundations and directed to different ends.

Locke identifies an additional power fathers ordinarily possess—the ability to distribute estates according to their will—which creates a practical tie on children's obedience beyond the parental authority itself.

Locke argues that children's subjection to their parents' political authority through inheritance is not a natural obligation but a voluntary submission, since they are born free and choose to accept inherited land on its conditions.

Locke explains how the father, naturally accustomed to rule during his children's minority, could easily become a prince of the family through the express or tacit consent of his grown children, exercising the executive power of natural law.

Locke cites Hooker's account that household chiefs became kings through deliberate advice and composition among men, not by natural right, showing that political government arose from consent rather than paternal authority.

Locke explains that children, accustomed to their father's care and guidance, naturally continue his rule into adulthood, finding security in his authority rather than desiring independence.

Locke concludes that if the fact of fathers being rulers proves their natural right to political authority, then by the same logic priests should be rulers (since fathers were originally priests), exposing the fallacy of Filmer's argument.