Chapter II

Locke defines the natural state of all men as one of perfect freedom to order their actions and dispose of possessions without depending on any other man's will, constrained only by the law of nature.

Locke argues that the state of nature is also one of equality where all power and jurisdiction are reciprocal, since creatures of the same species born with equal advantages and faculties should be equal without subordination unless God explicitly declares otherwise.

Locke cites Richard Hooker as an authoritative source who treats natural equality as evident and uses it to ground the duty of mutual love and the principles of justice and charity among men.

Hooker argues that equality among men of the same nature obligates each to love others as themselves, since equal things must have equal measure and we cannot expect others to show us more love than we show them.

Although men have uncontroulable liberty in the state of nature, they do not have liberty to destroy themselves or creatures without cause, for the state of nature is governed by a law of nature that obliges everyone.

Locke articulates the core principle of the law of nature: reason teaches that all being equal and independent must not harm another in life, health, liberty, or possessions, grounded in the fact that all are God's workmanship and servants.

Since all men are made by one omnipotent God and are His property made to last during His pleasure, not one another's, there cannot be subordination authorizing one to destroy another as if men were made for others' uses like inferior creatures.

Each man is bound to preserve himself and stay in his station, and by the same reason must preserve the rest of mankind when his own preservation is not in competition.

Since the law of nature would be in vain without enforcement, and there is no common authority in the state of nature, every man has the right to punish transgressors to the degree necessary to prevent violations and preserve the innocent.

Because there is perfect equality and no superiority or jurisdiction in the state of nature, if any one man may punish an offender, then every man must have the right to do so.

A man's power over an offender in the state of nature is not absolute or arbitrary but limited to punishment proportionate to the transgression, serving only reparation and restraint.

By transgressing the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule than reason and common equity, becoming dangerous to mankind and breaking the bond securing them from injury.

Because an offender's transgression is against the whole species and the law of nature, every man has a right to restrain or destroy harmful things and bring punishment on the offender for reparation, deterrence, and prevention of mischief.

Locke challenges those who doubt his doctrine by asking how a prince or state could punish an alien who commits a crime in their country, since the alien is not bound by their laws and the legislators have no authority over him.

If men do not naturally have the power to punish offences against the law of nature, Locke argues it is inexplicable how magistrates could have any power to punish aliens, since they can have no more power than what men naturally may have.

Besides the crime of violating the law of nature, there is often injury done to a particular person, giving that injured person a special right to seek reparation in addition to the general right of punishment held by all.

Locke distinguishes the universal right to punish crime for restraint from the particular right to demand reparation, which belongs only to the injured party, explaining how magistrates can remit punishment but not reparation.

A murderer has renounced reason and declared war against all mankind, so every man may kill him both to deter others and to secure themselves, grounded in the law that whoever sheds man's blood shall have his blood shed by man.

Lesser breaches of the law of nature may be punished to the degree sufficient to make the offence an ill bargain, give repentance, and terrify others, with punishment in the state of nature being as intelligible as positive law.

Critics object that the doctrine is unreasonable because self-love, ill nature, passion, and revenge will make men partial in judging their own cases and excessive in punishing others, leading to confusion and disorder.

Locke grants that civil government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of the state of nature where men may be judges in their own case, since an unjust man will rarely condemn himself.

Locke responds that if the problem is men being judges in their own cases, absolute monarchy—where one man judges all cases and subjects have no liberty to question him—is actually worse than the state of nature.

Locke answers the question of where the state of nature exists by noting that all independent princes and rulers are in a state of nature with respect to one another, proving men have always existed in that condition.

Not every compact ends the state of nature between men; only an agreement to enter one community and make one body politic does so, while other bargains between men leave them in the state of nature.

Truth and keeping of faith belong to men as men, not merely as members of society, so promises made between individuals in the state of nature are binding and valid.

Locke quotes Hooker to support that the laws of nature bind men absolutely as men, even without settled fellowship or solemn agreement, and that men unite in politic societies to supply deficiencies they have when living alone.

Locke affirms that all men are naturally in the state of nature and remain so until by their own consent they make themselves members of a politic society, promising to demonstrate this clearly in the sequel.