Chapter XIX

Locke distinguishes between the dissolution of the political society itself (which occurs through foreign conquest) and the dissolution of government (which can happen in other ways). The former necessarily entails the latter.

The legislative is the soul of the commonwealth, and when it is broken or dissolved, the government cannot subsist. When unauthorized persons make laws or when the established legislative is changed, the people are freed from obedience and may constitute a new legislative.

Locke posits a government with three distinct parts: a hereditary executive with power to convoke and dissolve the other two; an assembly of hereditary nobility; and an assembly of representatives chosen by the people. This serves as the basis for examining specific ways the legislative is altered.

When a prince enforces his own arbitrary will in place of the laws enacted by the legislative, the legislative is effectively changed because the executed rules are no longer those the society authorized.

The legislative is altered when the prince prevents it from assembling or acting freely, since the essence of the legislative consists not in mere names but in the actual exercise of power with freedom of debate.

When the prince changes the manner or persons of election without the people's consent and against their common interest, the legislative is altered because those chosen are not the representatives the people authorized.

When the prince or legislative delivers the people into subjection to a foreign power, the legislative is dissolved because the end for which people entered society—to remain an independent community governed by their own laws—is destroyed.

The prince bears primary responsibility for altering the legislative because he has force, treasure, and offices at his disposal, can act under pretense of authority, and can suppress opposition, whereas the people cannot attempt such changes without open rebellion.

When the supreme executive power neglects and abandons the execution of laws, the government dissolves into anarchy because laws without execution cannot bind society together or secure men's rights.

When government is dissolved, the people are at liberty to establish a new legislative differing in persons or form, as this is the society's original right to preserve itself. The people should act before tyranny becomes complete, not after they are enslaved.

The legislative acts against its trust when it endeavors to invade the property of subjects and make themselves or others arbitrary masters over the lives and liberties of the people.

Men enter society to preserve property, and authorize a legislature to make laws protecting it. When legislators attempt to destroy property or reduce people to arbitrary power, they breach their fundamental trust and the people are absolved of obedience and may establish a new legislative.

The executive breaches trust by setting up arbitrary will as law, or by corrupting representatives and manipulating elections to place loyalists in the legislative, which poisons the source of public security and is the greatest breach of trust.

An objector argues that because people are ignorant and discontented, founding government on their uncertain will exposes it to certain destruction and no government can subsist if people can change it at will.

Locke responds that people are actually very reluctant to abandon their familiar constitutions even when faults exist, and historical examples show people repeatedly return to their old forms of government despite provocations.

An objector warns that Locke's doctrine creates opportunity for rebellion whenever malcontents wish. Locke responds that miserable people will rebel regardless of theory; the doctrine only names what actually happens.

Locke argues that people endure great mistakes in governance without resistance, but when a long train of abuses and artifices makes an evil design visible, they rightly seek to place rule in hands that will preserve government's ends.

Locke argues that acknowledging the people's right to resist and establish new government is the best means to prevent rebellion, because it shows would-be tyrants the danger of their course and deters those most tempted to it.

Those who by force alter the established legislative or legislate contrary to their trust are the true rebels, because they reintroduce the state of war and destroy the authority the people consented to.

An objector argues that telling people they may resist illegal attacks on their liberty when it may cause civil war is destructive to peace. Locke responds that this is like saying honest men should not resist robbers to maintain peace.

Locke asserts that the end of government is mankind's good, and asks which better serves it: people always exposed to tyranny, or rulers sometimes liable to opposition when they exceed their power.

Locke contends that mischief from resistance only occurs when rulers create conditions making evil designs visible; particular examples of injustice do not move people to resistance, but when they universally perceive designs against their liberties, those who created such suspicion are to blame.

Locke leaves to impartial history the question of whether disorder more often originates in popular disobedience or in rulers' insolence and desire for arbitrary power, asserting that whoever by force invades the rights of princes or people is guilty of the greatest crime.

Though all agree subjects and foreigners may resist force against property, some deny magistrates may be resisted in the same way. Locke argues magistrates' offense is greater because they benefit from the law they break and betray their trust.

Whoever uses force without legal right puts himself into a state of war, canceling all former ties and giving everyone a right to defend themselves. Even Barclay, a champion of absolute monarchy, admits in some cases people may resist their king.

Locke extensively quotes Barclay's own argument that if a king tyrannizes over the whole people intolerably, they have a right to resist and defend themselves, though only to defend, not to attack or revenge.

The translation clarifies that Barclay allows self-defense as part of natural law and acknowledges the community may resist even a king, but only to defend themselves, not to attack or revenge, and only when tyranny is intolerable.

Locke notes that Barclay, as a great advocate of monarchical power, nonetheless allows of resistance, establishing that the question is one of degree and circumstances, not principle.

Locke critiques Barclay's requirement that resistance be with reverence and without retribution as impractical and absurd, arguing one cannot effectively resist force without striking back, and that resistance necessarily levels the parties and cancels former relations of superiority.

Locke argues that when resistance occurs, it creates a state of war that levels the parties and cancels former hierarchy, giving the justified resister a right to punish the unjust aggressor.

Locke quotes Barclay's own argument that a king may lose his authority in two cases: when he designs to destroy the commonwealth, or when he subjects his kingdom to foreign dominion.

Barclay acknowledges that a king ceases to be a king and can be resisted if he designs to destroy the commonwealth (illustrated by Nero and Caligula) or if he subjects his kingdom to another power.

Locke extracts from Barclay's cases the underlying principle that wherever authority ceases, kingship ceases, and the breach of trust in failing to preserve the government form and the public good is what matters.

Locke notes that Barclay allows resistance to prevent designed mischief before it occurs, and that neglect of the public good is evidence of tyrannical design, justifying resistance.

Locke argues that what matters is whether people's liberty is violated, not whether they are enslaved by their own nation or a foreign one. The injury lies in loss of liberty, against which people have a right of defense.

Locke cites various English authorities including bishops, legal writers, and Hooker to show that the principle that princes may forfeit their power is not new or radical but well-established.

Locke condemns the opposite doctrine (absolute obedience) as new, dangerous, and destructive to both rulers and people, having never been tolerated before and deserving to be abhorred.

The common objection asks who judges whether the prince or legislative breaches its trust. Locke replies that the people must judge, as the one who delegates power must retain power to discard an unfaithful trustee.

The question of judgment does not mean there is no judge; God in heaven is the ultimate judge, but each person judges for themselves whether another has put them in a state of war, and may appeal to God as supreme judge.

When a dispute arises between prince and people on matters where law is silent or doubtful and of great consequence, the body of the people is the proper judge of whether the prince acts within his trust, as they originally lodged that trust.

If the prince refuses the appeal to the body of the people, no earthly judge remains and force becomes properly a state of war in which only appeal to heaven is possible, and the injured party must judge when to make that appeal.

Locke concludes that the power individuals give to society can never revert to them while society lasts—it remains always in the community. Once the legislative is established, it does not revert to the people unless its duration was limited or it forfeited power.