Chapter XIV

Locke argues that in well-formed governments with separated powers, the executive must have discretionary power to act for the public good when legislators cannot foresee all contingencies and are too slow to respond.

Even prerogative power must yield to the fundamental law of nature and government, which is preservation of society members; thus harsh law enforcement can be mitigated when doing so serves the greater good.

Prerogative is formally defined as the power to act according to discretion for the public good, without law's prescription and sometimes against it, because legislators cannot foresee all accidents or make perfectly just laws.

When prerogative is employed for the community's benefit and suits the trust and ends of government, it is legitimate and the people do not challenge it; the tendency of its exercise—whether benefiting or harming the people—easily determines its legitimacy.

In the infancy of governments when they resembled families, government was almost entirely prerogative with few laws, but as princes began misusing this power for private ends, people found it necessary to define prerogative by explicit laws.

Locke identifies a common misconception that people who demand defined laws regulating prerogative are encroaching on rightful princely power.

Locke argues that defining prerogative by law does not rob the prince of his right, but only clarifies that unlimited discretion was conditional on use for the public good; since government exists for the community's good, any limitation serving that end cannot be an encroachment.

Locke criticizes those who imply the prince has an interest distinct from the community's good, arguing this contradicts the very nature of rational society and reduces people to a herd of inferior creatures rather than a community of rational beings.

A rational creature acting freely will not submit to another for his own harm, though he may trust a good ruler without demanding strict limits on his power.

Prerogative is ultimately the people's permission for rulers to act without or against law for the public good, and people rightly acquiesce when a good prince exercises it, but claim their right to limit it when a weak or ill prince abuses it.

English history shows that prerogative was largest under the wisest princes because people did not contest power exercised for the public good, even when technically against the letter of the law.

The saying that good princes are most dangerous to liberty is explained by the fact that their successors can cite their good actions as precedent for arbitrary power, even when used for harm.

It is impossible for anyone in society to have a right to harm the people, though it is reasonable for people not to restrict prerogative of rulers who do not exceed the bounds of public good.

The king's prerogative to determine the time, place, and duration of parliaments illustrates discretionary power properly exercised when used for the nation's good according to changing circumstances.

The question arises: who will judge whether prerogative is being rightly used, especially when the executive holds power over the legislature's convening.

When no earthly judge exists between executive and people, the people have the ultimate right to appeal to heaven—that is, to resist and judge for themselves whether they have just cause to overthrow rulers exercising power they never rightfully received.

People possess an inalienable right reserved by natural law to judge whether they have sufficient cause to appeal to heaven, since no person can surrender his right to self-preservation.

Though people possess this ultimate right to resist, it operates only when inconvenience becomes so great that the majority finds it necessary to act, so wise rulers need not fear it.