Chapter XII

Locke defines legislative power as the right to direct how the commonwealth's force shall be employed to preserve the community and its members.

Since laws are made quickly and their execution is continuous, there is no necessity for the legislative body to remain constantly assembled.

Locke argues that concentrating lawmaking and law-execution in the same hands tempts those holding power to exempt themselves from the laws and pursue private advantage, contrary to society's ends.

In properly ordered states, legislative power is distributed among multiple assembled persons who subsequently become subject to the laws they make, creating accountability.

Because laws require constant execution, there must exist a power always in being to enforce the laws made by the legislature.

Locke identifies a third power answering to the natural power each person possessed before entering society, arising from the commonwealth's status as a single body in the state of nature relative to other communities.

The federative power encompasses war, peace, alliances, and all transactions with external persons and communities outside the commonwealth.

Though executive power addresses internal municipal law enforcement and federative power addresses external security and interests, these two powers remain conceptually separate.

Because external affairs depend on the actions and varying interests of foreign actors, federative power cannot be effectively directed by fixed laws and must rely on the prudent judgment of those exercising it.

Internal laws can direct subjects' actions in advance because they govern predictable relations among members, whereas external affairs depend on foreign actions and must be managed flexibly for the commonwealth's advantage.

Although executive and federative powers are theoretically distinct, they cannot practically be separated into distinct hands because both require control of the commonwealth's force, and divided control would cause disorder.