Book VI

Aristotle recalls that he has already covered the nature of the supreme council, the regulation of magistrates, the judicial department, and the causes of governmental destruction and preservation.

Because there are many species of democracies and other states, Aristotle will examine modes of government suited to each, and inquire into combinations of different modes that alter the government.

Aristotle will first examine democracy and its opposite (oligarchy) by analyzing all parts of democracy, showing how different combinations create different species and how founders should understand these particulars.

Democracies vary because of different populations (husbandmen, mechanics, hired servants) and because different democratic features attach to them in varying combinations.

Aristotle establishes that liberty is the foundational principle of democracy, consisting of governing and being governed alternately according to numerical equality rather than worth.

Liberty in democracy means both alternating rule among citizens and the right to live as one chooses, which follows from the principle that no one should permanently rule over others.

Aristotle enumerates practical rules for democracy: magistrates chosen from all people in rotation, selection by lot, minimal property qualifications, short terms, and the people serving as judges in all cases.

A senate suits democracy best when the whole community is unpaid, to preserve its power; ideally, all citizens should be paid for public service, or at least judges and magistrates.

Democracy is characterized by rule of men of no birth, indigent circumstances, and mechanical employments, contrasting with oligarchy's rule by men of family, fortune, and education.

All democracies rest on the principle that members of the state should enjoy equality by number, with no rich having more power than poor, which constitutes the essence of popular government.

Aristotle raises the question of whether equality should be calculated by weighting property (five hundred rich equal one thousand poor) or purely by numbers, showing different systems produce different results.

Aristotle objects that accepting either pure numerical majority or pure property-based rule leads to tyranny or confiscation, as these extremes deny justice to the other party.

The just equality must be found in what both rich and poor approve, or what the greater party approves; when split, a weighted system based on census should decide which opinion becomes law.

Although determining true equality and justice is difficult, it is much harder to persuade those in power to be governed by it, since the weak desire equality but the powerful disregard it.

Aristotle identifies four species of democracies, with the best being that composed of husbandmen, which is also the most ancient.

A democracy of husbandmen is best because small property and need to work keeps them from constant assembly attendance, preventing them from envying magistrates or seeking excessive power.

This democracy is well-constituted because magistrates will be selected by the people with approval, nobles will not be governed by inferiors, and the people can censure magistrates after office, preventing abuse.

Aristotle recommends laws limiting land ownership, prohibiting sale of original lots, and preventing property accumulation through usury to maintain the husbandman character of the state.

After husbandmen, shepherds and herdsmen form the next-best democratic base, as they share similar virtues and produce good soldiers through their way of life.

Mechanics, traders, and hired servants form the basis of inferior democracies because their lives are wretched, they frequent assemblies too readily, and they lack virtue.

When much land lies far from the city, a good democracy is easier to establish because the country-dwelling people will be obliged to attend assembly, balancing the urban mob.

The last and worst democracy gives every citizen without distinction a share in every part of government; few can bear it and it is hard to preserve unless well supported by laws and manners.

Leaders of extreme democracy have tried to strengthen the people by broadening citizenship to include those with one parent as citizen, making the state more popular but risking disorder.

Demagogues should cease expanding democratic power once the commons surpass nobles and middle class, lest continued expansion cause disorder and noble resentment, as occurred at Cyrene.

To preserve extreme democracy, legislators should multiply tribes and fraternities, reduce private religious rites, blend people together, and break through old customs, following the model of Clisthenes at Athens.

Extreme democracy can adopt practices from tyranny such as licentiousness of slaves, women, and children, and allowing people to live as they choose, which supports such government.

Legislators should not aim to make democracy too perfect, but rather to render it stable; even a badly constituted state can continue a few days, but stability requires avoiding hurtful practices.

Instead of allowing courts to confiscate and divide property among the people (as demagogues do to flatter them), law should direct forfeitures to sacred uses, reducing motivation for false prosecutions.

The state should minimize cases brought before courts and severely punish those who rashly bring actions; nobles, not commons, are typically prosecuted, and citizens should treat rulers affectionately rather than as enemies.

Recently established democracies require paying citizens to attend assemblies, but insufficient revenue forces reliance on taxes, confiscations, and corrupt courts—practices that destroy democracies.

When revenues are small, there should be few assemblies and courts, but with extensive jurisdiction and brief sessions, so the rich won't fear expense and justice will be better rendered.

With sufficient revenues, rather than dividing surplus to the poor repeatedly, rulers should enable citizens to purchase property or trade implements; examples include Carthage and Tarentum.

States can combine election by vote (ensuring good governance) with election by lot (ensuring popular participation), sometimes choosing some magistrates by one method and some by the other.

Oligarchy should be framed with democracy in view as its opposite; every oligarchic species should be founded on principles diametrically opposite to some democratic species.

The best-framed oligarchy approaches a free state by employing two census levels—lower for ordinary officers, higher for supreme magistrates—with all within the lower census having some share in government.

The oligarchy most opposed to pure democracy and approaching tyranny is the worst and requires the greatest care, much as diseased bodies and leaky ships need more attention than healthy ones.

A large citizen body preserves democracy because it opposes aristocratic rule, while oligarchies depend on proper regulation of different social orders.

The type of military force—horsemen, heavy-armed, light-armed, sailors—determines the kind of oligarchy that can be established; horsemen support strong oligarchy, while light-armed and sailors support democracy.

Light-armed troops and sailors support democracy; in insurrection they defeat fortune holders, so an oligarchy recruiting light-armed troops forms a body against itself.

In oligarchies, fathers should teach sons light martial exercises when young, then all warlike exercises when grown, to prevent military weakness in defending the state.

Popular admission to oligarchic government should be regulated by census requirements, or by duration away from mechanical employment (Thebes), or by merit regardless of citizenship status (Massalia).

High-ranking magistrates should have their public service obligations clearly laid out to prevent common people from desiring such offices and to encourage respect for magistrates who pay a high price for honor.

Upon entering office, magistrates should make grand sacrifices and erect public structures, allowing people to enjoy festivities and see the city beautified, which gains their favor for stable government.

Present oligarchic leaders pursue gain more than honor, contrary to the proper conduct, and thus their oligarchies may be called 'little democracies' rather than true oligarchies.

Aristotle turns to detailed treatment of magistrates—their nature, number, and purpose—noting that no state can exist without necessary magistrates, nor be happy without those contributing to dignity and order.

Small states need few magistrates while large ones need many; one must know which offices can be combined and which must be separate.

A market magistrate is necessary to inspect contracts and maintain order, as markets are essential to communal life and mutual supply of wants.

Magistrates must oversee public and private buildings for ornament, repair falling structures, maintain highways, and preserve boundary landmarks, with separate officers in large cities.

Similar to city magistrates but for the countryside, these officers oversee land matters and forests, called inspectors of lands or woods.

Officers must be appointed to receive public revenue and distribute it to different departments, called receivers or quaestors.

A magistrate (or magistrates) must enroll all private contracts, court sentences, proceedings, and declarations, sometimes divided among many with one supreme officer, called proctors or notaries.

A magistrate must execute sentences on the condemned, collect fines, and guard prisoners—a necessary but disagreeable office requiring profitable compensation or proper law to ensure execution.

Rather than concentrate sentencing and execution in one person, different magistrates should judge different cases and different magistrates should execute sentences, reducing odium and ensuring proper enforcement.

When the same person judges and executes, they face universal hatred; by separating offices across magistrates, enforcement is easier and less resisted, as exemplified by the Athenian Eleven.

The execution office should not be separate or permanent but rotated among the young when there is a city-guard, as men of character decline it and worthless persons cannot be trusted with it.

High-ranking magistrates must defend the city, maintain walls and gates, and muster citizens in war and peace, with varying numbers of commanders depending on military organization.

Because many or all magistrates handle public money, other officers must audit their accounts and correct any mismanagement.

One supreme magistrate presides over all others, controls public revenue and taxes, presides over the people in popular states, and summons assemblies, called preadvisers or in larger states a council.

Magistrates overseeing religion include priests, those maintaining temples, and those organizing public sacrifices to the state's tutelar god, with varying arrangements in small versus large cities.

Aristotle enumerates the main departments of magistracies: religion, war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbors, and highways.

Courts require scribes to record contracts, guards for prisoners, officers to execute law, councils on either side, and overseers of those deciding cases.

States should appoint magistrates to give advice on public matters.

Prosperous states with leisure can appoint particular magistrates for women's governance, law execution, boys' education, gymnastic exercises, theatres, and public spectacles.

The office of governors of women is not of general use because the poor must employ their wives and children in servile work due to lack of slaves.

Three magistracies hold supreme power: guardians of laws (suit aristocracy), preadvisers (suit oligarchy), and senate (suits democracy).