Book V

Aristotle establishes the scope of the inquiry: examining the causes of governmental alterations and revolutions, their nature, which forms governments shift into, and the means of preserving all states.

Aristotle argues that most governments, though seeking justice and equality, fail because they misunderstand what equality means: some confuse equality in one aspect with equality in all aspects, while others mistake inequality.

When people feel they merit a share in government that matches their perceived equality with others, but fail to receive it, they become seditious—particularly affecting democracies and oligarchies.

Alterations in government take two forms: complete changes from one form to another (democracy to oligarchy), or changes in degree or particular aspects within the same form.

Aristotle distinguishes numerical equality (equal quantity) from proportional equality (equal value), noting that people dispute about which applies and this dispute generates democracies and oligarchies.

Democracies are more stable than oligarchies because sedition can arise in oligarchies from both internal conflict among the few and external conflict with the people, while in democracies it arises from only one source.

Aristotle identifies three foundational aspects to understand revolutions: distinguishing general causes, examining the condition of those initiating sedition, and identifying the origins of political troubles.

The most universal cause of governmental change is the desire of those who see themselves as equals to possess equality, or those who think themselves superior to gain superiority.

Sedition occurs in specific situations—aiming at just equality or unjust superiority—and springs from causes including profit, honor, and their opposites, along with seven deeper dispositions.

When magistrates behave haughtily and pursue personal gain, they provoke seditions among themselves and against the state; both unjust and excessive honors can destabilize government.

Those guilty of crimes fear punishment and conspire preemptively; those expecting injury take action to prevent it; and contempt, particularly in oligarchies, causes sedition and conspiracy.

Just as a body loses symmetry if one part grows disproportionately, a state's balance is destroyed when, for example, the number of poor increases dramatically relative to other groups.

Revolutions sometimes occur without sedition through negligence, overlooking small alterations, or accident; governments composed of mixed populations are especially liable to revolutions.

Small disputes between leading citizens can overturn governments because they draw the entire city into factional conflict; the beginning of such disputes must be carefully managed.

Aristotle provides multiple examples of governmental revolutions caused by disputes over marriage, inheritance, and family honor among notable persons.

When particular groups—such as a military force or maritime faction—gain significant power and victory, they often demand political supremacy commensurate with their newfound strength.

When rich and poor become roughly equal in strength, with little middle ground between them, the state becomes unstable; only when one party is clearly superior does stability hold.

Revolutions occur either through force or fraud; fraud may involve initial deception followed by force, or initial persuasion followed by willing consent.

Demagogues undermine democracies by pitting the common people against the wealthy, driving the rich into conspiracy and eventually enabling oligarchic or tyrannical takeover.

Formerly, demagogues who combined political and military power often became tyrants; this is now less common because skilled orators lack military capability.

In earlier times, concentrated power in magistracies combined with smaller city populations and rural populations allowed aspiring leaders to gain confidence and establish tyranny.

Without property qualifications for magistrate election, demagogues seeking office flatter the people into dominion over law, degrading democracy into lawlessness.

When the people are mistreated in an oligarchy, especially if a member of the oligarchy leads them, sedition is inevitable; every individual becomes ripe for revolution.

Oligarchies are unstable when wealthy men lack power and when political offices are restricted to very few; rotating office among brothers or age groups mitigates this.

Oligarchies contain two types of demagogues: those flattering the few in power, and those flattering the people; both undermine oligarchic stability.

When members of an oligarchy squander their fortunes through luxury, they become desirous of innovation and may attempt tyranny themselves or support others in establishing it.

If members of an oligarchy agree among themselves, the state is not easily destroyed without external force; internal harmony is the key to survival.

An oligarchy is undermined when power concentrates in a smaller oligarchy beneath it, especially when exclusion from supreme power festers among the broader oligarchic class.

In wartime, oligarchies employing mercenaries risk tyranny; in peacetime, distrust among members leads them to hire mercenary generals who become masters; marriages and lawsuits also provoke sedition.

When economic growth causes the census qualification to be met by a broader populace, oligarchies inadvertently transform into democracies through demographic change.

Aristocracies, like oligarchies, suffer when power is in too few hands; high-spirited common people or disgraced great men become seditious.

In aristocracies, economic inequality and desire for sole rule lead to sedition; during wartime, impoverishment breeds land-redistribution demands.

Free states and aristocracies are destroyed chiefly by improper mixture of democratic and oligarchic elements; the lack of balanced composition makes them unstable.

Even in states with democratic pretensions, the rich attempt to tyrannize others if given social rank, showing that form does not always match practice.

The most stable state is one where everyone enjoys the equality they deserve and securely possesses their property.

Thurii illustrates how lowering census qualifications enables more to govern, yet oligarchic land monopoly still distorts the result, leading to popular revolt.

Aristocracies decline insensibly when small laws are despised; each transgression makes the next easier, until the entire government transforms into a dynasty.

Governments fall to hostile neighbors with contrary principles; examples include the Athenians destroying oligarchies and Spartans destroying democracies.

Since destruction arises from specific causes, preservation comes from opposing those causes; Aristotle begins systematic treatment of preserving each form.

Small violations of law accumulate like household expenses; states must guard against small illegalities as carefully as large ones because each enables the next.

Those attempting to deceive the people with false pretences will eventually be confuted by facts; the state should resist such deceptions.

Aristocracies and oligarchies remain stable through wise conduct: respecting the excluded, including the worthy, and treating peers with equality.

Limiting magistrate tenure to short periods and rotating office among equals prevents the long tenure that enables tyranny in democracies and oligarchies.

Governments sometimes preserve themselves by fear of nearby danger; leaders should awaken people's fears to maintain constitutional diligence.

Early detection and legal restraint of disputes among the prominent prevents them from escalating and involving the whole state.

Oligarchies and free states must periodically review census qualifications against actual wealth; if qualifications become mismatched to reality, the system transforms.

All governments should prevent any individual from acquiring rank far superior to others; moderate honors conferred long-term are preferable to great honors conferred briefly.

An officer should inspect citizens' manners to prevent them from violating the state's character; those most prosperous should be balanced with opposing persons in office.

Balancing rich and poor by increasing the middle rank prevents seditions arising from inequality; this requires appointing people of different stations to different offices.

Public officers must not be bribed or profit-seeking; if excluded citizens suspect officials steal public money, discontent redoubles.

Making public office unprofitable combines democratic access with aristocratic rule: the poor avoid office to tend private affairs while the rich take it for honor.

All public money should be delivered openly and accounts deposited in different districts to prevent treasury defraudation.

Since magistrates receive no profit from office, the law should provide proper honors for those who execute their duties well.

In democracies, land division must be prevented and costly public entertainments restricted to protect wealthy citizens from popular spoliation.

Oligarchies must provide gainful public employment to the poor and severe punishment for the rich who insult them; estates should pass through succession, not gift.

Those without office should be granted equality or preference in other matters: the rich in democracies, the poor in oligarchies; principal offices go to the most qualified.

Officials should possess affection for the constitution, adequate ability for their role, and virtue appropriate to that state's justice.

When qualifications diverge among candidates, the rarer quality should be weighted more heavily; military courage over virtue for generals, but virtue over knowledge for financial officers.

Even if an official has ability and affection for the constitution, lacking virtue and prudence leads him to neglect public service as he might his own affairs.

Whatever laws contribute to state utility serve its preservation; the fundamental requirement is that more citizens desire preservation than destruction.

States must preserve balance in their governing principles; extending any principle to excess destroys the state, much like distorting a nose or body part past recognition.

Neither democracies nor oligarchies can survive without both wealthy and poor classes; destroying laws that authorize property inequality destroys the government itself.

Democratic demagogues wrongly attempt to make the common people superior to law, dividing the city; they should instead speak in favor of the wealthy.

Oligarchic magistrates currently swear to harm the people; they should instead swear not to injure them.

Educating children for the state is neglected yet most crucial; useful laws fail if citizens are not habituated to the constitution's principles.

Children should be educated to conduct either democratic or oligarchic government, not trained exclusively by oligarchic or democratic standards.

In oligarchies, the elite raise children delicately while poor children are hardened, making both desirous of innovation; pure democracies incorrectly define liberty as doing as one pleases.

Kingdoms arise to protect the better sort and are formed from virtue or noble descent; tyrannies arise from the meanest populace as enemies to the better sort.

Tyrannies originate from demagogues gaining popular credit, from kings exceeding their authority, or from those elected to superior offices choosing despotism.

Kings gain their position through virtue, noble family, beneficent actions, or power to benefit the state; examples include founders, liberators, and protectors.

Kings desire to be guardians securing property and preventing injury; tyrants seek only personal pleasure and wealth, with no regard for the common good.

Kings maintain guards from their own citizens, while tyrants require foreign mercenaries, indicating distrust of their people.

Tyranny combines oligarchy's aim at gain with democracy's hostility to nobles; it persecutes the populace like oligarchy and destroys the great like democracy.

Conspiracies against monarchies arise from injustice, fear, and contempt; contempt has the strongest influence, sometimes from loss of private fortunes.

Plots either target the ruler's life, stemming from hatred, or target the government itself; the former arises from many causes sufficient to excite anger and vengeance.

Harmodius conspired against the Pisistratids for insult to his sister; Periander was killed for improprieties with a boy; Philip was slain for failure to avenge Pausanias.

Many conspiracies have arisen from those physically punished with stripes; the resentment of such treatment drives men to kill those responsible.

Those who fear punishment for past acts ordered by the monarch, or who anticipate injury, will conspire; example: Artabanes conspiring against Xerxes from fear.

When a ruler is held in contempt by people or even by friends, conspirators feel confident they will not be discovered and will attempt his deposition.

Powerful generals at the head of armies, despising both the monarch's life and forces, readily attempt to dethrone him through contempt of danger.

Contempt and desire for gain, when joined, create strong motivation for conspiracy, as with Mithridates against Ariobarzanes.

Those of bold disposition with military honors are most likely to engage in sedition; united strength and courage make them readily attempt conspiracies.

Unlike others seeking wealth, some embrace danger to conspire against tyrants purely for glory; they regard personal safety as nothing, exemplified by Dion.

Tyrannies face destruction from hostile neighboring states with contrary principles; democracies oppose tyrannies, and kingly powers oppose aristocracies.

Tyrannies are destroyed from within when those without power bring about revolution; successors to tyrants typically fail to maintain the tyranny.

Hatred seems inseparable from tyranny; contempt is often the ultimate cause of its destruction, especially when second-generation tyrants become effeminate.

Anger impels action more powerfully than hatred and proceeds with greater obstinacy; combined with contempt, it destroyed the Pisistratidae and many other tyrannies.

Hatred is more powerful than anger because anger is accompanied by grief, which prevents reason's entrance, while hatred is free from grief.

Tyranny experiences the same destructive causes as pure unmixed oligarchy and extreme democracy because they are divided tyrannies.

Kingdoms are generally very stable against external attack but have numerous internal causes of subversion.

Kingdoms fall internally when those in power excite sedition or when they attempt tyranny by assuming greater power than law permits.

True kingship, based on voluntary submission and power for great occasions, is rarely seen; modern monarchies are typically tyrannies established by force or fraud.

Hereditary kingdoms are subject to revolution when successors are contemptible or insolent without despotic power; the people's voluntary submission requires respect.

Kingdoms endure when royal power is limited; reduced power prevents despotism and equality with subjects, reducing their envy.

The Molossi kingdom lasted long through moderation; Sparta's divided power and ephori established by Theopompus increased its duration by reducing the king's authority.

Tyrannies persist when power is delegated from one ruler to another, as Periander reportedly established and as occurs among the Persians.

Tyrants suppress aspiring persons, eliminate dissidents, prevent public gatherings, education, and mutual confidence through spies and fear.

Tyrants impoverish subjects so they cannot compose a guard and employ them in daily survival; examples include Egyptian pyramids and other monumental works.

Tyrants multiply taxation to collect private property and engage subjects in war to keep them employed and dependent on their general.

A king is preserved by friends, but a tyrant cannot trust friends since they have power and desire to destroy him.

Like extreme democracies, tyrannies permit women and slaves great freedom so they will reveal secrets and become abettors of the tyranny.

In both tyrannies and extreme democracies, flatterers are in repute: demagogues in democracy, sycophants in tyranny; both serve the respective powers.

Tyrants love bad men who will flatter them; virtuous men with self-respect refuse flattery and represent a threat to tyrannical superiority.

Tyrants hate worthy men and those who defend freedom because such persons encroach on tyrannical superiority and despotism.

Tyrants should admit strangers to familiarity rather than citizens, since citizens are enemies while strangers have no designs against him.

Tyrannical plans aim at three goals: making citizens abject and spiritless, destroying mutual confidence, and denying them power.

The three objects—abject disposition, lack of mutual confidence, and absence of power—ensure that people cannot conspire against the tyrant.

The opposite method of preserving tyranny is to affect appearance of kingship while maintaining power; this makes the government more stable and durable.

Tyrants should appear concerned with public welfare and give money carefully, not lavishly on mistresses and entertainers, to seem like guardians.

Tyrants who leave hoarded money behind when departing risk innovation from their regents, who are more feared than citizens.

Tyrants should seem to collect taxes for public exigency, not as personal property, and maintain exact accounts to appear as family guardians.

A tyrant should inspire veneration rather than fear and should not appear contemptible; he must possess political ability to maintain this respect.

Tyrants should not commit improprieties against modesty, nor permit their family members to treat others haughtily, as such behavior has ruined many tyrants.

Unlike some tyrants who indulge openly, the prudent tyrant should be moderate in pleasure or appear to be, since drunkenness and sluggishness invite contempt and plots.

A tyrant should develop and beautify his city to seem a guardian rather than a tyrant, and should appear particularly attentive to religious worship.

Tyrants should display great respect for worthy men so they do not think they would receive greater distinction in a free state.

All honors should flow directly from the tyrant, but censure should come from subordinate officers and judges, appearing to come from them rather than the tyrant.

Tyrants should not make any one person too great; if power must be entrusted to someone, choose one of moderate disposition and gradually reduce his power.

Tyrants must abstain from insolence, especially corporal punishment of the honorable, since such men resent disgrace and may conspire for revenge.

When a tyrant disgraces someone, he should compensate with greater honors; this helps manage the resentment of the proud.

Those most likely to conspire against a tyrant are those who regard loss of their own life as nothing to achieve their purpose, especially those affronted or with dear ones wronged.

All cities contain rich and poor; the tyrant must ensure both receive equal protection and neither party can injure the other.

The tyrant should attach himself to the stronger party; their added strength makes him superior to any conspiracy and eliminates need to free slaves or disarm citizens.

The rule for tyrants is to affect appearance of kingship and guardianship while maintaining power, treating nobles with respect and the people with soothing care.

A tyranny appearing kingly is more durable and worthy of imitation because it rules over worthy men rather than wretches who perpetually hate and fear it.

Tyrants should at least partially align their manners with virtue so they are not altogether wicked, but only partly so.

Oligarchies and tyrannies are the shortest-lived of all governments; very few last long due to inherent instability.

The tyranny of Orthagoras at Sicyon lasted longer than others because rulers were moderate, obedient to law, militarily able, and kept government partially popular.

Pisistratus submitted to court summons and a judge crowned another as victor, demonstrating how appearing to respect law extends tyranny.

The Cypselid tyranny at Corinth lasted seventy-seven years and six months; Cypselus governed without guards as a popular figure, while Periander was a capable general.

The Pisistratid tyranny at Athens was interrupted; Pisistratus held power only fifteen of thirty-three years, and his son eighteen years, totaling thirty-three years.

Hiero and Gelo reigned only eighteen years combined; Thrasybulus fell in eleven months; most other tyrannies lasted very short times.

Aristotle critiques Plato's Republic for treating governmental change inadequately, focusing on general claims about temporal change rather than specific causes.

Plato claims bad men will not submit to education, but this does not explain why this peculiarity applies to the best government more than others.

Plato claims the best government changes into Lacedaemonian form, then oligarchy, democracy, tyranny; but governments change into contrary forms, not similar ones.

Plato does not clearly explain whether tyranny changes, into what, or why; he fails to recognize that tyrannies change into various forms and one tyranny into another.

Tyrannies change into oligarchies, democracies, or aristocracies; examples from Sicilian and other cities show multiple transformation paths.

It is absurd to attribute oligarchic change only to rulers' avarice; rather, richer citizens resent equal power with poorer citizens.

Carthage is a democracy where money-getting is creditable, yet the form of government remains unaltered, contradicting Plato's thesis.

Plato claims oligarchies contain two cities (rich and poor), but this applies equally to Sparta and other states with unequal property without leading to revolution.

Plato assigns oligarchic change to citizens becoming poor through luxury and debt, but this fails to account for multiple causes and the variety of governmental outcomes.

Though many oligarchies and democracies exist, Plato treats governmental change as if there were only one of each sort, missing the variety of causes.