Book III

Aristotle establishes that understanding what a city is must be the first inquiry for anyone studying government, as it is the common object of political science.

The definition of citizen is disputed and relative to the form of government; one who is a citizen in one state may not be in another.

Residence alone, legal privilege to sue, being a boy or elderly, or banishment do not constitute complete citizenship.

A complete citizen is distinguished by sharing in the judicial and executive parts of government.

Aristotle addresses the distinction between fixed and indeterminate offices, arguing that those who can exercise either type are citizens.

Since governments differ in form, the duties and privileges of citizens necessarily differ accordingly.

A citizen is one who has the right to share in the judicial and executive parts of government in a city, and a city is a collective body of such persons sufficient for life.

Common usage defines a citizen as one born of two citizen parents, with some extending this to multiple ancestral generations.

Gorgias points out that the descent-based definition cannot apply to the first founders of states, creating a logical absurdity.

Despite the question of legal validity, someone illegally made a citizen through changed government is still a citizen, as the definition refers to exercising office.

Aristotle raises the question of which acts belong to the city versus to its government, particularly during governmental transitions.

The question of whether a city remains the same city when place, population, or government changes is posed as a complex inquiry.

A city is not defined by its walls or physical boundaries, as shown by counterexamples like Babylon which encompassed many nations.

Like a river changing its waters while remaining the same, a city may be the same despite continuous replacement of inhabitants.

A city's identity is determined by its form of government; a change in constitution means a different city despite same location and people.

Aristotle poses the central question whether the qualities that make a good person are identical to those that make a good citizen.

Just as different sailors have different functions but all aim at the ship's safety, citizens have different roles but all serve the community.

The virtues required of a good citizen cannot be uniform across different governmental systems.

A city requires citizens with different roles and abilities, so universal excellence in all citizens is impossible.

Just as an animal has dissimilar parts (body, soul) and a family has unequal members, a city requires dissimilar citizens with different virtues.

A good magistrate requires prudence and virtue, and some persons might possess virtues of both ruler and good citizen.

A good ruler must have different virtues from good subjects, though an accomplished citizen should know how to both command and obey.

Those engaged in manual labor or servile work cannot fully participate in ruling; learning such trades is degrading for those of honor.

In true political government, free equals learn to rule by first obeying, and good citizens must know both how to command and be commanded.

Courage and temperance manifest differently in men and women according to their different social roles.

While most virtues are required of all, the knowledge and direction of public affairs is peculiar to those who govern.

The question arises whether those not permitted to hold office, such as mechanics, should be considered citizens.

Boys and mechanics may be citizens but imperfect ones, lacking full participation in government.

The best-ordered states will not permit mechanics to be citizens, as their servile employment prevents virtue.

Aristotle distinguishes slaves (employed by one person), mechanics and hired servants (working for pay), with different political status.

Aristocracies exclude mechanics because their servile life prevents virtue; oligarchies admit wealthy mechanics since wealth is their criterion.

States with labor shortage admit mechanics, foreigners, and children of slaves as citizens, but revoke these privileges when population grows.

There are many sorts of citizens depending on state type; only those sharing in state honors are complete citizens.

Humans by nature desire to live in society both for mutual advantage and for the ability to live well.

There are various modes of government including master-slave, domestic, and political rule, each with different purposes.

The master's power over slaves is naturally serviceable to both but aims at the master's benefit; the slave benefits only incidentally.

Authority over family is directed toward the benefit of those governed, as in medicine and gymnastics where the expert aims at the subject's good.

In true political government among equals, citizens expect to rule in turn, each administering the public good for others as they were administered to.

Governments aiming at the common good are rightly established and just; those serving only the rulers are tyrannical and unjust.

Governments are classified by whether supreme power rests with one person, a few, or many, and whether they serve the common good.

A kingdom is rule by one for common good; an aristocracy is rule by few virtuous; a state is rule by many citizens for public good.

Valour is the one virtue commonly found in whole nations due to being created and supported by numbers.

Kingdom degenerates into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and state (democracy) into corrupt democracy—all abandoning the common good.

A tyranny is one-person absolute rule; an oligarchy is rule by the rich; a democracy is rule by the poor or common people.

Difficulty arises in defining these forms when the actual rulers' composition contradicts the wealth distribution (e.g., poor majority ruled by rich few).

The crucial distinction is wealth of rulers, not their quantity; rule by the rich (few or many) is oligarchy; rule by poor (always numerous) is democracy.

Justice always refers to persons with particular relations; what is equal and just differs depending on whether persons are equals or unequals.

People naturally tend to judge partially in their own cases and mistakenly think unequal in one respect means unequal in all.

Civil society aims not just at preserving life but at enabling people to live well; it is not a commercial alliance like treaties between states.

The founder of a genuine city must attend to the virtues and vices of individual citizens, not merely prevent injury as commercial treaties do.

Even close proximity, intermarriage, and commercial laws do not make a city; a city requires common laws and shared life for happiness.

A city is a community of families joining to live agreeably and achieve a happy, independent life through family meetings and social bonds.

Those who contribute most to the city's virtuous living deserve greater power than those equal in family and freedom but inferior in civic virtue.

Aristotle poses the difficulty that each possible location of supreme power (poor, rich, best men, or one tyrant) leads to injustice.

Though no individual of the many may be fit for supreme power, when joined together they are better qualified than the few, bringing diverse knowledge.

Like fine pictures that combine beautiful parts from different originals, the multitude collectively understand more than any single excellent person.

Since the masses lack property and consistent virtue, they cannot hold all offices but should vote, judge cases, and audit magistrates.

One might argue that electing magistrates should be done by those skilled in governance, as physicians judge physicians.

In some arts like house-building and steering, the non-expert who uses the product may judge better than the expert craftsman.

The assembly, council, and judges collectively possess more property and power than individual magistrates, justifying their supremacy.

Laws should have supreme authority with magistrates deciding particular cases laws cannot address, and good government has good laws.

The highest art of founding civil society aims at justice, which consists of appropriate equality.

Superior family does not entitle one to the best flute; only superior musical skill matters, showing that relevant qualifications determine distribution.

Height, strength, beauty, and similar attributes, though valuable in general, have no relevance to fitness for political office.

Those with family, economic independence, fortune, justice, and valor—not arbitrary superiorities—should contend for offices.

Those equal in property are unequal in virtue and vice versa; governments based on assuming total equality/inequality from one aspect are erroneous.

The wealthy claim power as landowners with stable loyalty; the free and noble claim it by honor; virtue claims it as necessary to society.

The masses argue that collectively they are stronger, richer, and better qualified to rule than the few.

When good, rich, noble, and common people all inhabit one city, there is confusion about which group should have supreme power.

By the logic used by oligarchs and democrats, one exceptional individual richer, nobler, or more virtuous would be justified in ruling all.

None of the proposed principles (wealth, family, virtue, numbers) provide a just foundation for supreme power without exceptions.

Correct law should distribute offices equally to the whole state and each member, advantaging all by reflecting true equality.

Those eminent in virtue so far beyond others that they are like gods should not be treated as ordinary citizens under law.

Democratic states use ostracism to expel those with exceptional power, wealth, or influence to maintain equality.

Oligarchies and democracies, like tyrannies, remove excessively powerful individuals to prevent dominance.

Just as painters and shipwrights maintain proper proportions, rulers should balance power to prevent any part from becoming excessive.

When someone is preeminent in virtue rather than wealth or power, they should rule perpetually rather than be banished.

Monarchical government takes multiple forms with varying distributions of power and constraints by law.

In Sparta, the king's power is confined by law; he is essentially a general for life with religious duties but no power of life and death except in war.

Barbarian kings have nearly tyrannical power yet are bound by law and custom; they rule willing subjects and are guarded by citizens.

The aesumnetic power is elective despotism held temporarily or for specific purposes, making it both tyrannical and kingly.

In heroic times, those who benefited mankind in arts or arms became hereditary kings with limited, lawful powers over willing peoples.

Aristotle lists: heroic (king as general, judge, priest); barbarian (hereditary despotism by law); aesumnetic (elective tyranny); Lacedaemonian (hereditary generalship).

An absolute king has supreme power in all matters as the state has over public affairs, analogous to a family master.

The many types of kingship can be reduced to absolute monarchy and Lacedaemonian generalship, with others between them.

The fundamental question is whether a virtuous king or written laws should hold supreme authority in a state.

Laws cannot address every particular circumstance, whereas a skilled person can adjust treatment; this seems to favor personal rule.

While a good man might judge particulars better, law possesses the key advantage of being reason free from human passions.

Just as sick people distrust physicians who might be bribed by enemies, people should distrust rulers motivated by favoritism or hatred.

A multitude is less likely to be corrupted by anger or passion than a single person, as water is less corrupted by quantity.

If a state had many good men, multiple rulers would be better than one king, preventing factional disputes.

When equally virtuous men are available, a government of many is preferable to rule by one, for both practical and theoretical reasons.

Early governments were monarchies because few virtuous men existed; later aristocracies arose; then oligarchies when wealth replaced virtue; then tyrannies; finally democracies.

A king cannot easily prevent unfit children from succeeding, yet cannot be trusted to exclude them—this weakness favors law over monarchy.

A king must have enough force to compel obedience to law, but such power can be abused to override the law.

A king should have power exceeding any individual or large faction but less than the whole community, as ancients granted to tyrants.

When the state consists of equals, one person's absolute rule over others violates nature and proper justice.

For natural equals, taking turns ruling is natural law, not arbitrary; law should govern rather than individuals.

Unlike human rulers subject to passions, law represents pure reason and is therefore superior to individual judgment.

Passions corrupt even the best men in power, making law preferable to any individual.

Physicians themselves consult medical texts rather than rely on individual judgment when ill, showing preference for established principles.

Justice consists of finding the mean; law achieves this better than individual discretion.

Multiple good men can see more and decide better than one person, avoiding the blind spots of individual perspective.

Even absolute monarchs entrust parts of their power to friends as subordinates, and friends are equals, so the monarch should allow other equals to govern.

Some peoples are naturally suited to kingship, others to aristocracy, others to democracy, based on their nature.

Where people are naturally equal, rule by one person without law and without their consent is neither advantageous nor right.

Peoples accustomed to submission suit kingship; naturally virtuous peoples suit aristocracy; martial peoples suit democratic government.

When one family or person so excels in virtue as to surpass all others, they should rule as king, not be banished or rule by turns.

Justice principles support this: the highest should not be rotated to the lowest position of obedience.

Of the three regular forms, the best is administered by the most virtuous, whether one, family, or several.

In the best state, the qualities that make a good person and a good citizen are identical.

The same education and moral qualities that produce a good man produce a good citizen or good king.

Having established these points, Aristotle indicates he will now inquire into which form of government is best and how to establish it.