Book VI

Aristotle recalls that he has already examined the supreme council, magistrates, judicial systems, and causes of governmental change and preservation.

Since there are multiple species of democracies and other states, one must examine each type's characteristics and the combinations of governmental elements that alter the form of government.

Aristotle proposes to examine democracy first, which will clarify its opposite (oligarchy), by studying all component parts whose combinations create different species of democracy.

There are two reasons for different types of democracy: variations in the population composition (farmers, mechanics, servants) and variations in which democratic features are present in each state.

State founders attempt to include all similar elements in their plans but make characteristic errors in doing so, as previously discussed regarding preservation and destruction of governments.

Democracy is founded on liberty, understood as alternating rule and being ruled, with power based on numerical equality rather than merit.

Democratic liberty comprises two components: alternating rule and ruling based on numbers, and the right to live as one chooses free from constraint except by rotation.

From the principle of liberty, Aristotle derives specific rules: magistrates chosen from all people by lot (except technical offices), short tenures, broad judicial participation, and supremacy of the public assembly.

A senate suits democracy best when citizens are unpaid; if paid for assembly attendance, the people will appeal all cases and undermine the senate's power.

When possible, all citizens with public roles should be paid; at minimum, magistrates, judges, senators, and assembly members should receive compensation.

Democracy is characterized by government in the hands of those of low birth, poor circumstance, and mechanical occupations, in contrast to oligarchy.

No office should be held for life in a democracy; if any remain from prior systems, their power should be gradually diminished and replaced by lot-based selection.

All members of the state should enjoy equality based on numbers, not worth, which constitutes the essence of democracy and preserves both equality and liberty.

Aristotle raises the question of how to achieve equality: whether five hundred rich should equal a thousand poor, or whether to divide equal numbers from each group to select magistrates.

Democrats claim majority approval determines justice; oligarchs claim property value determines it; both positions are unjust as they can lead to tyranny or confiscation.

True equality comes from principles both groups accept; when city contains rich and poor, establish what both approve, or what the greater part approves according to weighted census.

Although determining what is equal and just is difficult, persuading the powerful to follow such principles is harder still, since the weak desire equality while the powerful disregard it.

Aristotle identifies four types of democracies, with the best composed of farmers as the majority, being the most ancient form.

Democracy of farmers is best because they lack leisure for constant assembly attendance, desire riches over honor, will not envy superiors, and are satisfied with election rights and magistrate oversight.

Farmers throughout history tolerated tyranny and oligarchy if left to their occupations and property; having election and censorial rights over magistrates satisfies their honor desires.

Some states grant only a representative body election rights while the commons retain deliberative power, as at Mantineia, which constitutes a valid democratic species.

Farmer democracies should allow people to censure magistrates after office and judge all causes; chief magistrates should be elected by census or ability, ensuring best-qualified leaders without popular envy.

Making magistrates subject to oversight prevents them from exercising unlimited power, which would unleash the evil tendencies present in all humans.

This type is best because the people have appropriate powers and the magistracy is filled by principal persons while the people are not oppressed.

To establish farmer democracy, ancient laws limiting land possession and preventing sales or accumulation through usury prove universally useful.

The Aphutaeans divided limited land so that poor had more power than rich by census, demonstrating how property laws can serve democracy.

Shepherd and herder populations rank second to farmers as democratic bases, sharing farmers' qualities and producing excellent soldiers.

Mechanics, traders, and hired servants form inferior democracies with wretched lives; they frequent assemblies readily but lack farmers' virtues.

When land extends far from the city, stable democracy requires country dwellers' participation, even when urban assembly mobs exist.

Aristotle recommends proceeding from the best democracy to others by separating the meanest people from the rest.

The worst democracy grants every citizen equal share in all administration; it is difficult to preserve without strong legal and moral support.

Leaders of extreme democracy expand citizenship to include all free-born and those with citizen parents, making the state more democratic.

Expansion should continue only while commons exceed nobles and middle rank; beyond this, disorder ensues and provokes noble resentment and insurrection.

To increase popular power, institute multiple tribes and fraternities, reduce private religious rites, expand common rites, and blend the people together.

Extreme democracy tolerates licentiousness in slaves, women, and children to a degree, and allows everyone to live as they choose, which supports the government.

Legislators should aim to preserve government stability rather than perfect its theoretical form; any state persists briefly, but longevity requires careful preservation.

What contributes to governmental stability matters more than what makes it purer; practices making democracies more purely democratic may harm their preservation.

Demagogues flatter the people through frequent property confiscations in courts; true statesmen should prevent this to avoid condemning the rich and destabilizing the state.

Confiscated property should go to sacred uses rather than the treasury, so the accused faces same punishment and the people gain no profit from condemning others.

Minimize public cases and severely punish those who rashly bring actions; prosecutions target nobles, so fellow citizens should not treat the powerful as enemies.

Many modern democracies require payment to attract assembly attendance; without sufficient revenues this threatens the wealthy, forcing destructive taxes and corrupt courts.

With limited revenues, have fewer assemblies and courts; but give courts extensive jurisdiction and limit sittings to few days, benefiting both rich and justice.

With sufficient revenues, avoid dividing money in doles that create endless demand; instead accumulate funds and distribute lump sums enabling poor to own land or learn trades.

If funds insufficient for all to receive substantial amounts simultaneously, distribute by tribes or other divisions until all receive enough for productive work.

The wealthy should compensate the poor for necessary work but not for idle entertainments.

Carthage preserved popular affection by continually sending colonists abroad, maintaining sufficient conditions for the masses.

A generous nobility can maintain popular affection by dividing the poor among themselves, supplying necessities and inducing work.

Tarentum won popular affection by allowing the poor to share common necessities.

Some magistrates should be elected by vote for good governance, others by lot so the people share administration.

Aristotle concludes his account of how democracies ought to be established.

To frame an oligarchy, use principles diametrically opposite to some species of democracy.

The best oligarchy approaches a free state with two census levels: the lower qualifies for ordinary offices, the higher for supreme magistracies, with those in the lower census superior to the excluded.

The oligarchy most opposite to pure democracy and closest to tyranny is worst and requires the greatest care to preserve, just as diseased bodies need more attention than healthy ones.

A large population preserves democracy because it opposes rank-based rights; conversely, oligarchy preservation depends on proper regulation of different social orders.

The four social classes—farmers, mechanics, traders, servants—correspond to four military divisions: cavalry, heavy-armed, light-armed, and sailors.

Where cavalry dominates, a powerful oligarchy can be easily established, since only the wealthy can afford horsemen.

Where heavy-armed troops dominate, an inferior oligarchy can be established, as these soldiers are typically propertied persons.

Light-armed and sailor forces support democracy; when numerous, they can defeat the wealthy in insurrections.

Light-armed soldiers are effective against cavalry and heavy-armed forces; they give the populace advantage in insurrections.

An oligarchy should avoid forming light-armed troops, as doing so creates a democratic force within its own body.

Fathers should teach youth light exercises when young, then perfect them in all warlike exercises when grown.

In oligarchy, popular admission should be regulated by census (as at Thebes, by time away from mechanical work, or as at Massalia, by merit).

High magistrates' public obligations should be expressly defined to discourage common people from desiring those offices and to generate favor toward magistrates.

Magistrates should make magnificent sacrifices and erect public structures, so the people enjoy entertainment, see city beautified, and witness governmental stability.

Public works and votive gifts in temples preserve memory of noble generosity.

Current oligarchs pursue gain rather than honor, making their governments resemble petty democracies rather than proper oligarchies.

Aristotle concludes his explanation of principles for establishing both democracies and oligarchies.

Every state requires necessary magistrates; additional magistrates for dignity and order enable happiness.

Small states need few magistrates; large states need many; some offices combine while others separate.

The first necessary magistrate inspects markets and contracts, preserving order and satisfying the mutual wants that bind communities together.

A magistrate oversees public and private buildings, roads, and boundary markers to maintain city ornament and prevent disputes.

In large cities, urban inspection divides among separate officials for buildings, fountains, and harbors, called city inspectors.

Similar to city inspectors, country inspectors oversee land and woods outside the city.

Officers must be appointed to receive public revenue and distribute it to various state departments.

An officer enrolls private contracts, court sentences, and proceedings; sometimes this divides among many with one supreme officer, called proctors or notaries.

The most necessary yet difficult office oversees execution of sentences, payment of fines, and prisoner custody; without this, judgment becomes meaningless and society cannot subsist.

Sentence execution is disagreeable and odious, so few accept it without high compensation, and those without proper incentive won't execute fairly.

Judgment and execution should not be unified in one person but divided among magistrates to reduce odium and enable proper enforcement.

Fine collection and levy should be divided among different persons to reduce odium.

Young judges should hear cases of young people; this principle extends to sentence and execution.

When one person judges and executes, they become enemies to all; separation improves voluntary compliance with law.

At Athens, the Eleven had custody of prisoners while others executed sentences, exemplifying prudent separation.

The execution office should not be permanently assigned to individuals; rather, young men should rotate through it, or a city guard should manage it.

Execution office deserves attention equal to other necessary magistracies despite its unpopularity.

Military magistrates must be skilled and faithful, overseeing city defense, walls, gates, and military organization in war and peace.

Military organization varies: small cities have one general; larger ones appoint distinct commanders for cavalry, heavy-armed, light-armed, and sailors, with sub-commanders forming an unified military body.

Since many magistrates handle public money, officers must audit accounts and correct mismanagement.

A supreme magistrate oversees all others and controls public revenue and taxes; presides over the assembly when supreme power is theirs; sometimes called preadvisers, or a council when many.

Priests and temple overseers manage religious functions and property, with roles distributed differently by state size.

Officers manage public sacrifices to tutelary deities that the laws do not entrust to priests, with different titles in different states.

Magistrate departments cover religion, war, taxes, expenditures, markets, public buildings, harbors, and highways.

Courts require scribes for recording contracts, guards for prisoners, enforcement officers, counsel on both sides, and supervisors of decision-makers.

Magistrates provide advice on public matters.

Wealthy states with leisure for detail require specialized magistrates: governors of women, law enforcers, educators of boys and their gymnastic trainers, theater and spectacle overseers.

Governors of women are not universally necessary; the poor lack slaves and must use their families for servile work.

Three magistracies can hold supreme power: guardians of laws (suit aristocracy), preadvisers (suit oligarchy), and senate (suits democracy).

Aristotle concludes his brief treatment of all necessary magistrates.