Papers 15-22: Confederation's Defects

Hamilton reminds readers that he has established Union's importance and will now examine the Confederation's insufficiency through facts and arguments, asking for patience with the length of the inquiry.

Hamilton asserts that both friends and opponents of the Constitution agree the Confederation has material imperfections and that something must be done, though facts have forced this reluctant admission.

Hamilton catalogs specific ways the Confederation has degraded national character: broken treaties, unpaid debts, territorial losses, weak military, failed commerce, and declining public credit.

Hamilton urges citizens to break free from the faulty maxims that have brought them to crisis and adopt the proposed Constitution.

Hamilton identifies the logical inconsistency in opponents' position: they acknowledge the Confederation's defects but refuse to grant federal government the powers needed to correct them.

Hamilton identifies the core defect as legislation directed at states collectively rather than at individual citizens, which renders federal laws mere recommendations that states can ignore.

Hamilton argues that a true government must have laws with enforceable sanctions; without penalties, laws are only advice and cannot constitute government.

Hamilton asserts that past claims about states willingly complying based on common interest are naive, arguing from experience that bodies of men act with less rectitude than individuals and possess an inherent impatience with restraint.

Hamilton uses the metaphor of subordinate spheres flying away from a common center to explain why states with sovereign power naturally resist federal control.

Hamilton demonstrates that if state legislatures must execute federal measures, they will judge those measures by parochial interest rather than national necessity, leading to inconsistent and failed execution.

Hamilton traces how the requirement for thirteen states' agreement led to cascading defections, with non-complying states encouraging others to follow suit until the government nearly ceased functioning.

Hamilton asserts that the principle of legislating for states rather than individuals inevitably produces anarchy and delinquency in confederate systems, a fact confirmed by all confederate history.

Hamilton contends that using force to compel state compliance would either fail (if the Confederacy lacked sufficient military) or dissolve into civil war, making it an unreliable remedy.

Hamilton distinguishes between the violent death that coercion would cause and the more gradual dissolution the system currently experiences through states' voluntary defection.

Hamilton argues that when federal law acts directly on citizens rather than through state legislatures, states cannot quietly evade compliance but must openly usurp power, making such attempts rare and dangerous.

Hamilton asserts that private sedition and minor insurrections can be suppressed by federal magistracy more effectively than by individual states, and that major revolutions exceed any government's capacity to prevent.

Hamilton presents the objection that direct federal legislation over citizens would tempt the federal government to absorb state powers.

Hamilton argues that domestic police, agriculture, and private justice hold no charms for ambitious federal leaders compared to commerce, finance, and war.

Hamilton asserts that the people of the states, through their elected representatives, would control any federal disposition toward usurpation.

Hamilton argues that state governments will naturally possess superior influence over citizens due to proximity and control of daily administration of justice, giving them advantage in resisting federal encroachment.

Hamilton grounds state advantage in human nature: people feel stronger affection for near objects than distant ones, making them biased toward local over national government.

Hamilton identifies ordinary administration of courts as the strongest tie binding people to government, and since states control this, they will naturally dominate loyalty.

Hamilton argues federal benefits are general and abstract, perceived only by educated observers, while state benefits are immediate and visible, giving states greater popular attachment.

Hamilton compares feudal systems to confederacies, noting that when powerful vassals treated dependents justly, they resisted monarchical power, but when they oppressed dependents, those dependents joined the monarch against them.

Hamilton cites Scotland's history showing how clan loyalty made nobles stronger than the crown until union with England created a more rational system that subdued the aristocracy.

Hamilton argues that state governments in a confederation are like feudal baronies—naturally possessing popular loyalty and power, hence able to resist federal encroachment.

Madison and Hamilton describe the ancient Greek Amphictyonic council—its federal authority over independent city-states, powers of coercion, and theoretical sufficiency.

Madison and Hamilton show that despite theoretical powers, Amphictyonic council failed because power was exercised by state deputies over states collectively, leading to domination by stronger members and internal discord.

Madison and Hamilton argue that the Amphictyonic confederacy failed because stronger members competed for dominance and jealousy prevented necessary reformation, leading to internal war and conquest by Macedon.

Madison and Hamilton describe the Achaean league as having a more intimate union and wiser organization than the Amphictyonic, with unified laws and a praetor, showing progress in confederate design.

Madison and Hamilton cite historians showing that the Achaean league maintained more justice and order than cities governing alone, due to tempering by general authority.

Madison and Hamilton trace how the Achaean league, despite early reform, fell to internal divisions fostered by Macedon, then Rome, ultimately destroyed by foreign manipulation of state jealousies.

Madison and Hamilton conclude that the review of ancient confederacies demonstrates confederate systems tend toward anarchy among members rather than tyranny in the head.

Madison and Hamilton trace how the Germanic empire evolved from Charlemagne's unified realm through feudal decentralization, with vassals gradually achieving independence.

Madison and Hamilton describe the modern Germanic empire's structure—diet, emperor, and courts—and the constitutional powers supposedly delegated to these bodies.

Madison and Hamilton argue that despite impressive constitutional powers, the Germanic system fails because it legislates for sovereigns rather than individuals, rendering it incapable of regulating members.

Madison and Hamilton chronicle Germanic history as a record of wars between emperor and princes, wars among princes, weak enforcement of requisitions, and general disorder.

Madison and Hamilton cite the Donawerth case where the Duke of Bavaria used a coercive commission as pretext to conquer and annex the city, illustrating how military enforcement becomes instrument of usurpation.

Madison and Hamilton explain that the Germanic system persists despite weakness because member states fear isolation, the emperor's separate power matters, and foreign powers prefer its weakness.

Madison and Hamilton mention Poland as an example of confederacy unfit for self-defense, and describe the Swiss cantons as barely constituting a confederacy, kept together only by geography and weakness.

Madison and Hamilton describe Swiss cantons' minimal common institutions—no treasury, troops, coin, or judiciary—held together by geography, religion, and mutual defense needs.

Madison and Hamilton show that the Swiss confederation failed when religious controversy created real discord, leading to separate cantons, separate diets, and separate alliances with foreign powers.

Madison and Hamilton describe the Netherlands as a confederacy of aristocratic republics, with complex requirements for unanimity among provinces and cities in major decisions.

Madison and Hamilton detail the stadtholder's considerable prerogatives—settling provincial disputes, commanding federal troops, military appointments, and naval authority.

Madison and Hamilton state that despite theoretical sufficiency, the Netherlands exhibits practical weakness, provincial discord, foreign influence, and inability to enforce contributions.

Madison and Hamilton demonstrate that the union's constitutionally required contributions have never been executed fully, with provinces waiving constitutional articles and Holland effectively subsidizing others.

Madison and Hamilton explain how foreign diplomats exploit the unanimity requirement by tampering with provincial and city representatives, delaying treaties.

Madison and Hamilton show that the Netherlands has repeatedly exceeded constitutional bounds in critical situations, proving that weak constitutions must either usurp power or fail.

Madison and Hamilton argue that the stadtholder's influence in provinces has been necessary to prevent the confederacy's anarchic tendencies from dissolving it entirely.

Madison and Hamilton note that surrounding powers force the Netherlands to maintain some union while simultaneously using intrigue to maintain its internal vices and weakness.

Madison and Hamilton cite four extraordinary assemblies convened to reform the Netherlands' constitution, all failing to achieve necessary reforms due to public division.

Madison and Hamilton reflect that the Netherlands now suffers from popular convulsion, state dissension, and foreign invasion, illustrating the ultimate consequences of confederate defects.

Madison and Hamilton conclude that experience demonstrates a fundamental truth: legislating for communities rather than individuals substitutes violence for law and sword for magistrate.

Hamilton identifies the Confederation's want of any power to enforce obedience to its laws—it can neither levy penalties nor suspend privileges.

Hamilton identifies the want of federal guaranty for state republican governments, which could leave states vulnerable to domestic usurpation while union is powerless to help.

Hamilton argues that guaranty is essential against violent usurpation but would not prevent peaceful constitutional reform, and that Massachusetts's recent troubles prove such dangers are real.

Hamilton argues that apportioning contributions by quotas based on land value or population cannot produce justice, as national wealth depends on countless complex factors.

Hamilton demonstrates through examples that wealth depends on innumerable factors—situation, soil, climate, government, genius of citizens—making any fixed quota rule impossible.

Hamilton predicts that quota-based contributions would create such inequality that suffering states would abandon union, making the system self-defeating.

Hamilton proposes that taxes on consumption naturally self-regulate and distribute more fairly than quotas because individuals pay according to their resources.

Hamilton argues that consumption taxes have a built-in limit—excessive taxes reduce consumption and collection, creating natural restraint on government excess.

Hamilton suggests that direct taxes on land and buildings could be apportioned by population numbers, which he views as simpler and more certain than land valuation.

Hamilton identifies the Confederation's lack of power to regulate commerce as a defect agreed upon by all parties, essential to managing trade relationships.

Hamilton explains that foreign nations refuse advantageous trade terms because they know states can violate federal agreements, making federal commerce authority essential.

Hamilton shows that individual states' interfering regulations are causing disputes among states and warnings that without national control they will become sources of animosity.

Hamilton identifies the practice of raising armies by demanding quotas from states as problematic, causing competition, excessive bounties, short enlistments, and poor discipline.

Hamilton explains that states near military theaters made greater efforts than distant ones, but unlike money, deficiencies in troops could not be tracked or recovered.

Hamilton argues that giving equal votes to states of vastly different size and population violates republican principles of majority rule.

Hamilton contends that no logical argument can justify Rhode Island having equal power to Massachusetts, as it contradicts proportional representation.

Hamilton acknowledges that two-thirds requirement might seem to ensure majority states' interests, but demonstrates that nine states can include less than a majority of people.

Hamilton argues that requiring more than majority means giving minority negative power, making minority can block majority, producing delays and weak government.

Hamilton contends that supermajority requirement makes government more vulnerable to foreign bribery, as foreign powers need corrupt fewer representatives to obstruct action.

Hamilton explains that unlike monarchs with personal interests in state glory, republican leaders can be tempted with personal rewards exceeding their stake in common good.

Hamilton cites examples from ancient confederacies and modern republics (Netherlands, Sweden) showing historical prevalence of foreign powers purchasing republican leaders.

Hamilton identifies the want of a federal judiciary power as a significant defect, since laws require courts to interpret and apply them.

Hamilton argues that treaties must be uniform in application, requiring a supreme tribunal to ensure consistent interpretation and prevent contradictory state court rulings.

Hamilton contends that state courts will naturally defer to state authority and prefer state law over federal law, making federal supremacy impossible without a supreme federal court.

Hamilton emphasizes that treaty enforcement rests on thirteen different state legislatures and courts, making union's faith and reputation hostage to every state's prejudices.

Hamilton concludes his review by asserting that the Confederation is so fundamentally defective that it admits of no amendment but complete change in its leading principles.

Hamilton contends that a single assembly was appropriate for the weak powers previously delegated, but is unfit to exercise the additional powers necessary for a real government.

Hamilton warns that if the Constitution is not adopted, progressive augmentation of Congressional power could result in accumulated sovereignty in a single body, creating tyranny.

Hamilton argues that the Confederation rests only on state legislature consent, not popular consent, making it subject to questions of validity and even claims of legislative repeal.

Hamilton contends that national government must rest on consent of the people directly, not state legislatures, to have solid and legitimate foundation.