Book the Third

Montaigne distinguishes between naturally speaking foolish things and deliberately striving to be foolish, citing Terence to establish that conscious folly is worse than accidental speech.

Montaigne presents Tiberius's refusal of an offer to assassinate Arminius by poison as evidence that even a braggadocio can acknowledge virtue, showing that honesty can prevail over profit.

Montaigne argues that human imperfections—ambition, jealousy, envy, revenge—are naturally embedded in us and even in animals, and that removing them would destroy the fundamental conditions of human life.

Montaigne asserts that all governments contain necessary but vicious offices, and that these should be entrusted to the strongest and boldest citizens who sacrifice honor for the common good.

Montaigne expresses trouble at judges using fraud and false promises to extract confessions, arguing this malicious justice wounds itself as much as the criminal.

Montaigne recounts his role mediating between princes, emphasizing his refusal to deceive and his commitment to sincerity, which paradoxically made his negotiations successful.

Montaigne claims that his frank manner, absence of personal interest, and evident simplicity made him trusted and effective despite—or because of—departing from conventional diplomatic deception.

Montaigne describes himself as unswayed by passion toward the great, neither prompted by injury nor obligation, suggesting his freedom from personal interest enables his integrity.

Montaigne asserts that all legitimate intentions are naturally temperate and equable; those that are otherwise degenerate into sedition and unlawfulness.

Montaigne establishes that treachery can only be justified when used to punish and betray treachery itself, supported by examples of those who used deceit against deceivers.

Montaigne provides multiple historical examples—Jaropelk, Antigonus, Clovis, Mohammed II—of rulers who employed treachery but then severely punished or killed the traitors, showing the paradox of accepting the crime.

Montaigne argues that even if rewarded, a person who commits treachery is viewed with contempt by the ruler who employs him, and his hand and soul are enslaved to public convenience.

Montaigne acknowledges that a prince compelled by urgent circumstance may forfeit his word, but this is misfortune not vice if done with regret and heavy conscience.

Montaigne uses Timoleon's slaying of his brother-tyrant as an example of a necessary but morally troubling act, whose justification depends on subsequent virtuous conduct.

Montaigne argues that private interest cannot excuse breaking a promise made under duress; one remains obliged even when fear has ceased.

Montaigne elevates Epaminondas as a supreme example of combining military excellence with scrupulous ethical conduct, maintaining justice and courtesy even in war.

Montaigne contends that not all things are lawful for an honest man in service to his prince or country, invoking Epaminondas and Cicero to show that some private duties supersede public demands.

Montaigne rejects Lucan's exhortations to ignore piety and family bonds in warfare, calling for a more human justice and condemning wicked natures from using such rhetoric.

Montaigne notes that in different eras of civil war, soldiers' attitudes toward killing relatives reversed, suggesting that morality is contingent on social example rather than principle.

Montaigne argues that even if an action is necessary and profitable, it does not follow that everyone is obliged to perform it; the nature of the person matters.

Montaigne claims to only report himself as he is, not reform him, and notes that his portrait must change with him since constancy itself is but slower motion.

Montaigne proposes himself as ordinary and private, applying moral philosophy to his common life, and claims to rarely repent while maintaining submission to accepted belief.