Introduction

Paine acknowledges that his ideas are not yet fashionable, but argues that custom has a superficial appearance of rightness that generates strong defensive reactions. He claims that time, not reason, ultimately converts people to new ideas.

Paine establishes the principle that prolonged abuse of power gives people the right to question that power, and specifically asserts that Americans have the right to inquire into both the King's and Parliament's pretensions and reject either's usurpation.

Paine commits to avoiding personal compliments or censure of individuals, arguing that the wise need no vindication and the injudicious will convert themselves without excessive persuasion.

Paine elevates America's struggle from a local dispute to a universal human concern, arguing that the destruction of natural rights affects all people capable of feeling, transcending party allegiance.

Paine notes that the publication was delayed to allow for refutations of his doctrine of independence, but since none have appeared, the work now proceeds unopposed.

Paine argues that his identity is irrelevant since attention should focus on the doctrine itself, and he asserts his independence from any party or influence except reason and principle.

Paine establishes the fundamental distinction between society, which arises from human wants and promotes happiness positively, and government, which stems from wickedness and restrains vices negatively.

Paine argues that even the best government is a necessary evil (like clothing, a sign of lost innocence) that becomes necessary only when moral virtue alone cannot govern; security is its true design and end.

Paine uses the thought experiment of a small isolated group of people to show how society would form naturally from mutual need, since one person alone cannot survive or accomplish tasks.

Paine argues that even in a naturally formed society, as people relax their moral virtue once initial hardships cease, the inevitability of vice necessitates the establishment of government to supply the defect of morality.

Paine describes how a small colony's first government would be simple, with the whole community assembling to deliberate and laws enforced only by public disapproval, with every man having a natural right to participate.

As the colony grows and distances increase, direct participation becomes impractical, so the community delegates legislative power to representatives who share the same interests and are supposed to act as the whole body would.

Paine argues that frequent elections ensure representatives don't develop separate interests from constituents, as they will return to the general population and face consequences for their actions.

Paine concludes that the mutual support generated by common interest among all parts of the community, not hereditary kingship, is the true foundation of governmental strength and the happiness of the governed.

Paine summarizes that government originated as a mode made necessary by the inability of moral virtue alone to govern, and its proper design and end are freedom and security.

Paine establishes that simpler forms of government are less susceptible to disorder and easier to repair, and he derives his ideas of proper governmental form from this natural principle.

Paine grants that the English constitution represented progress in a tyrannical age, but argues it is now imperfect, subject to convulsions, and incapable of delivering on its promises.

Paine contrasts absolute governments, which are simple and transparent in their tyranny, with England's exceedingly complex constitution, which obscures the source of national suffering.

Paine analyzes the English constitution as comprising monarchical tyranny (the king), aristocratical tyranny (the peers), and new republican materials (the commons), with virtue depending on the last.

Paine argues that because the king and peers are hereditary and independent of the people, they contribute nothing to the constitutional sense toward the freedom of the state.

Paine dismisses the claim that England's three powers check each other as either meaningless or self-contradictory, establishing that checking theory presupposes both monarchy's inherent thirst for power and the commons' superior wisdom.

Paine identifies a logical absurdity: the constitution gives the commons power to check the king by withholding supplies, but then gives the king power to check the commons by rejecting their bills, creating a contradiction about who is wiser.

Paine exposes the internal contradiction of monarchy: it isolates the king from information needed to rule effectively, yet demands he exercise the highest judgment in matters affecting the entire state.

Paine critiques the explanation of the English constitution as the king versus the people with peers and commons as representatives of each, arguing this is merely a house divided with idle, ambiguous language masking incomprehensibility.

Paine asks how the king acquired power that the people fear and must check, arguing such power could not come from a wise people or from God, yet the constitution presupposes its existence.

Paine argues using mechanical analogy that the greater weight (the crown) will always carry the lesser, and while other powers may clog its motion, they cannot stop it; the crown will ultimately prevail.

Paine asserts that the crown dominates the English constitution through its power to give places and pensions, meaning England has paradoxically locked the door against absolute monarchy while giving the crown the key.

Paine argues that Englishmen's attachment to their king, lords, and commons system arises more from national pride than rational analysis, and that individual safety there is due to people's constitution, not governmental form.

Paine concludes that the crown is not as oppressive in England as in Turkey due to the constitution of the people, not the constitution of the government, laying aside all national pride.

Paine argues that examining constitutional errors is necessary because people cannot do justice to others or themselves while influenced by leading partialities or obstinate prejudices, just as a man attached to a prostitute cannot judge a wife.