XI - International Warnings

The author directly addresses capitalists, property owners, industrialists, and merchants as the most stubborn political abstainers, calling them to examine the example of the French Empire.

The author recounts France's recent material prosperity: active circulation of values, doubled commerce, industrial dominance, abundant capital, and military expansion from Sebastopol to Mexico.

The author describes France's military power incarnate in frigates and battalions, and its political dominance with a dynasty centralizing seven million votes against a powerless minority opposition.

The author argues that despite this outward show of metal and power, great moral spirit was absent from the system.

The author catalogs France's moral failures: exclusive materialism, corruption of parliamentary representation, abandonment of political morality, reduction of social values to rapid profit and physical pleasure, exemplified by figures like Morny and Offenbach.

The author presents war as the consequence of France having material bread but lacking moral circuses and spiritual strength.

The author recounts how France, atrophied by materialism and corruption, suffered invasion without unified resistance, despite its history of heroic battles.

The author argues that hundreds of thousands or millions of French failed to resist because they valued their property and income over national sacrifice, and espionage further undermined the cause.

The author describes how Prussia, through its military victory, instilled in its soldiers a sense of Teutonic hegemony and divine predestination.

The author asks what capitalists, property owners, industrialists, and merchants gained by abstaining from moral intervention in politics, answering that ruined values, devastated fields, burned factories, and closed warehouses attest to their loss.

The author argues that if France had maintained moral religion, political integrity, resisted corruption, and governed itself through good representation, war might have been prevented.

The author suggests that with moral clarity, France would have found more jubilation in prudence and peace than in fortune's chances and war's trials.

The author contends that if war were inevitable, a morally strong France would have faced defeat with universal respect, earning moral pressure from other powers even in military loss.

The author laments that moral gangrene brought down French leadership, and Europe watched indifferently as France descended into anarchy, though he hopes for resurrection through patriotism and liberty.

The author asks what would happen to a smaller nation like Portugal in similar circumstances, given that even a large nation like France fell to moral decay.

The author posits a scenario where a Spanish army crosses Portugal's border and a Spanish fleet enters the Tagus River, arguing that this scenario is possible even if improbable.

The author warns that without moral forces, proper instruction in non-material values, and patriotic principles, Portugal will be unable to defend itself or its liberty and fortunes.

The author posits an absurd hypothesis where Spanish forces move unopposed to Portugal's heart, questioning whether capitalists would truly escape the consequences of invasion.

The author asserts that eight centuries of hatred and conflict cannot be undone in a day, suggesting Portugal would resist Spanish occupation like Poland resisting Russia.

The author poses the dilemma for capitalists of whether they would help restore independence or collaborate with the invader, noting that any resistance would require their financial and material sacrifice.

The author posits an absurd hypothesis that capitalists might accept Spanish occupation to preserve their property, then asks what would follow from such collaboration.

The author argues that collaboration with a Spanish invader would precipitate an internal social war between poor and rich, patriotic workers and satisfied bourgeoisie, creating eternal hatred.

The author warns that if Portugal unexpectedly recovered independence, the mobs would turn on collaborating capitalists, destroying their property and leaving no one to save them but the nation itself.

The author argues that all these dangers become impossible if the nation maintains convergence of wills, honest and patriotic employment of all forces, and common management of shared patrimony.

The author notes that it is difficult for four million Portuguese to resist fourteen million Spanish, establishing a numerical imbalance.

The author argues that Portugal can regain equilibrium through order, liberal politics, wise administration by Portuguese for Portuguese, and respect, offsetting its numerical inferiority.

The author contends that well-administered Portugal could match Spain in capacity despite numerical disadvantage, especially if Spain remains divided among parcialidades and disorganization.

The author concludes by warning that if Portugal matches Spain's state of disorder and disorganization, then the question of physical weight will obey material laws, implying numerical superiority will determine the outcome.