X - Call to Action

The author claims not to presume to correct the world or give unsolicited advice, but rather to condense and express the patriotic concerns that the reader himself has already voiced.

The author warns readers not to practice public hypocrisy about the nation's decay, noting that criticizing the author for speaking truth would be self-defeating since they have already said the country is rotten.

Portugal faces a severe moment where the social edifice is crumbling under a biblical curse of fatality, with vital national forces declining into deplorable collapse across commerce, industry, and agriculture.

Portugal pursued civilization and material progress through infrastructure and credit, but neglected the moral and spiritual dimensions needed to sustain such development, resulting in the current moral and political crisis.

Truth must be spoken plainly to a nation in danger; true patriotism requires healing the wound through moralizing and energetic action rather than silence and dissimulation.

The author establishes a logical chain linking moral criterion to responsibility, responsibility to will, will to good politics, and ultimately good politics to stable government and public confidence.

While individual honesty exists in private transactions, Portugal's political sphere lacks the collective moral framework needed, with factionalism and political manipulation substituting for genuine principle.

Political parties in Portugal lack coherent principles, instead following winds of fortune; programs change with power and opposition, and corruption is endemic to the electoral process.

Titles and decorations are lavished indiscriminately on unworthy recipients, creating a system where political favor replaces merit and elevation depends on momentary power rather than principle.

Laws change constantly through successive reforms, leaving citizens confused; respect for the principle of authority erodes among the masses, who only obey near election urns.

The public ignores serious literature and parliamentary debate, instead relishing scandalous pamphlets, lies, and slander, valuing audacity in falsehood as a skill.

When a military sergeant closes parliament and an attempted coup occurs, all factions rush to court the victorious usurper, abandoning principle for power, with competing vices each claiming to be the remedy.

After the coup was undone by another coup, the nation showed it lacked internal strength to cure itself, confessing impotence by leaving remedy to the crown; the dictator's laws and cronies were retained despite the supposed restoration.

The repeated pattern of courting power without scruple demonstrates conclusively that Portugal lacks the moral framework necessary for principled governance.

The Portuguese people, emerging slowly from enforced ignorance imposed by absolute monarchy, do not yet understand their constitutional rights and corresponding duties to the state.

When the constitution was suspended by dictatorship and the king granted extraordinary power to the Duke of Saldanha, the crown violated its own irrevocability and the rights to name ministers and manage constitutional procedures.

Parliament fails to exercise its right to legislate independently, interpellate ministers effectively, or defend the prerogatives of individual members against executive pressure.

When deputies attempt to interpellate ministers on important matters, the government simply refuses to answer, and the majority postpones the question, nullifying this essential parliamentary check.

The government lacks firmness to carry out legitimate executive functions like dismissing officials; public pressure and parliamentary interference undermine administrative prerogatives.

Government acts superior because parliament is malleable; parliament assumes ministers exist to serve special interests; both neglect the nation's actual rights and needs.

Public officials face no real responsibility; even egregious abuses like paying seven years' salary to a dismissed official are forgotten; moral responsibility is entirely absent.

Recent electoral and political events show that Portugal lacks genuine collective will, with the electorate shifting dramatically in response to government manipulation rather than principle.

The electorate divides into indifferent citizens, fearful subjects, and corrupt speculators, with authority manipulating them all, rather than voters exercising independent judgment.

Indifferent electors treat all candidates as equal, valuing personal favor and family connection over public interest, choosing based on petition and proximity rather than ability.

Timid electors form the base of parliamentary majorities, voting with whoever is in power, guided by local officials who use authority to extract votes like shearing sheep.

Administrative officials at all levels pressure voters to support government candidates, and while not all do so, the practice is widespread enough to deprive majorities of legitimacy.

Though administrative intervention may appear to create stable majorities, it actually prevents the electorate from developing political judgment and true will.

A third class of voters actively corrupt the process by selling their votes for money, promises, ribbons, or local favors, turning elections into commerce.

Corruption stems from poverty, stupidity, vanity, hate, servility, or low self-interest, and extends to collective corruption where districts trade votes for local projects.

The laborer who sells his vote for small money contributes to bad deputies, bad chambers, bad governments, and bad finances that later cost him far more in lost work during economic crises.

On the day of military coup, Lisbon remained calm and commerce continued normally, yet in hours the government fell and constitutional order collapsed, proving the nation exercised no collective will.

Good politics requires good parties, and good parties require public spirit; Portugal has only factions and groups driven by personal interest rather than principle.

A true party exhibits logical consistency in ideas, steadfast defense of principles, and unity in discipline; Portuguese groups lack these characteristics entirely.

While allied deputies agree on factional matters, they split immediately on economic and social questions that should unite a coherent political school.

Parties fighting passionately for reform while in opposition abandon those same reforms once taking office, proving their commitment was tactical rather than principled.

Rather than maintaining coherent organization, Portuguese groups constantly fuse, ally, and reconstitute themselves based on momentary advantage rather than enduring principles.

Fearing they cannot govern, weak party leaders fill government portfolios with clients and recommendations, using state resources to purchase loyalty rather than building principled organizations.

The Marquis of Avila governed three times without representing any party, a constitutional impossibility in any true parliamentary system, showing the complete disorganization of Portuguese politics.

Without strong, coherent parties, Portuguese governments become ephemeral, like castles of cards, unable to withstand minor disturbances or maintain policy continuity.

Crown hesitation in face of street agitation, popular anarchization by speculation, media destruction of reputations, and political opportunism all undermine government stability.

The press constantly demolishes reputations through character attacks, making all political figures appear unworthy, and the small educated class means every minister is eventually discredited.

Deputies and officials shift loyalty based on whether the government is rising or falling, on personal disappointment, or on unfulfilled ambitions for higher office.

Ministers lack the resolve to resist external pressure and maintain proper executive independence; they are chosen for factional reasons rather than merit; and they take office without prior agreement on policy.

Each minister brings his own coterie of supporters, creating internal divisions; this gravitational politics replaces genuine cabinet solidarity.

Ministers make campaign promises while in opposition they cannot or will not keep; these become ammunition for opposition attacks and sources of internal conflict.

Ministers oscillate between feverish activity to defend their positions and bored apathy, lacking the middle ground of courageous prudence needed for stable governance.

Governments reflect the moral perturbation of society, but the nation exaggerates the consequences of government errors rather than cooperating in correction.

Public confidence is fundamental to representative government; without it, people doubt the future, hesitate, and government becomes merely a matter of relative power density.

Public confidence is empirical and positivist; it needs stable facts and reality, not government programs and parliamentary speeches.

With political situations shifting rapidly and unpredictably, the public cannot develop stable expectations and begins to distrust all governments, promising or not.

Rather than linking administration to tradition and creating continuity, governments pursue showy reforms, abandon urgent business, and leave difficult problems unsolved.

Parties do not tighten ranks against government attacks; majorities avoid responsibility for weak governments they support; betrayal replaces loyal opposition.

Nine parliamentary dissolutions in thirteen years represent revolution within constitutional forms; they prove government instability and teach the electorate contempt for the electoral process.

Repeated dissolutions create constant local conflict between election campaigns, destroying the neighborhood peace necessary for public confidence.

Repeated elections fail to save governments because ministerial candidates of yesterday become opposition deputies of today, seeking favor from new powers.

When public confidence fails, the price of state debt falls, national values depreciate, capital retracts, and the entire economy stagnates from fear.

Loss of confidence causes capital to retreat in specie or seek higher-yielding state debt, reducing productive investment in commerce and industry.

Industry suffers immediately from restricted credit, as lenders fear risk; production falls because reduced consumption provides no incentive to increase supply.

Agriculture, Portugal's greatest industry, cannot expand cultivation, improve land, or optimize production without capital support and favorable prices.

When consumption and production fall, commercial transactions necessarily decrease; trade cannot develop without active credit support.

During the Regeneration period, five years of stable government and party support created public confidence that doubled exports and increased imports significantly.

When the population loses faith in national prosperity, emigration increases and even non-emigrants lose incentive to labor, working only minimally for subsistence.

Unable to predict which sectors will be taxed next, entrepreneurs cannot plan investments; the fear of vexatious new taxes paralyzes economic activity.

Portugal can bear additional taxation to address the deficit, but only if increases are proportional and coordinated with economic development.

The annual deficit of nearly 8,000,000 réis cannot be closed by taxation alone without destroying productive capacity; increased tax collection requires economic growth.

Seeking to close an 8,000,000 réis deficit through taxation alone would require crushing increases that would break economic activity and ultimately reduce total revenue.

While reducing expenditures is virtuous and necessary, government savings cannot alone bridge the deficit; the real solution requires developing national wealth.

Political factions exploit the appeal of economy to avoid raising taxes and gain popularity, while actual savings are minimal relative to the deficit.

Only expanding the tax base through economic growth can sustainably increase revenue without destroying productive capacity or burdening the poor.

Since 1852, Portugal has spent nearly 46,579,000 réis on public works; while needed, this massive investment must now be tempered to preserve fiscal stability.

The deficit has grown catastrophically from 2.7 million reis in 1864-1865 to 7.6 million in 1868-1869; without correction, bankruptcy or national humiliation will follow.

Public expenditure increased by an average of 3.8 million réis annually over five years, from 97.3 million in the first five-year period to 116.5 million in the second.

Interest on consolidated internal and external debt totals 10.3 million réis annually, a burden that cannot be sustained if the deficit continues growing.

Claims of debt cancellation cannot be verified from official documents; treasury reports suggest debt is merely repackaged rather than actually reduced.

If the deficit continues doubling every four years, Portugal will face either financial collapse (bankruptcy) or national humiliation (Iberia, meaning Spanish takeover).

Portuguese citizens hold over 350 million réis in securities and savings; if this capital were deployed productively, national ruin could be prevented.

The primary and greatest reform must be popular moral reform; government shortcomings are real but the people have exaggerated them rather than cooperating in remedy.

Portugal believes everything and disbelieves everything; criticizes governments for what it does daily; practices censorious inaction while condemning those who act.

Those who withdraw from politics while criticizing all action form a destructive party of indifference; they shed tears for the nation while offering no resistance to decay.

The false belief that only specialized politicians should govern alienates citizens from their political responsibility and enables abuse by entrenched elites.

The thinking classes, property owners, and workers must directly intervene in governance; they have direct interest in stable administration and cannot afford abstention.

Each citizen is responsible to all others, all are responsible to each one, and each is responsible to himself; this absolute solidarity requires engaged participation.

Intelligence needs environment to develop; capital is depreciated by policy failure; labor suffers from poor public management; all have profound interest in stable governance.

The abstentionist faction must be destroyed; all citizens must engage; those who currently isolate themselves must recognize their self-interest and active duty.

Those who criticize government failures while refusing to help solve them are worse than soldiers who fight alongside bad causes; at least fighters take risks.

Portugal's many splinter groups must consolidate into two coherent parties with clear programs, representing genuine political divisions rather than factional interests.

With numerous groups claiming to be progressive, parties lack coherence; two distinct parties—progressive and conservative—would force real program definition.

Parties must offer coherent programs on concrete issues—free trade, decentralization, parliamentary reform, colonial policy—not groupings around individual leaders.

If progressivism is chosen, the historical party should be strengthened with fresh forces from other groups and given a concrete program of reform.

Alternatively, those favoring conservation can organize the conservative party with clear identity and program, which has nothing dishonorable in defending stability.

If parties consolidate into two distinct organizations, the shameful practice of politicians switching parties weekly for personal advantage would end through public contempt.

Strong party organization would replace the destructive system where politicians are valued for personal connections rather than program or principle.

The thinking classes, property owners, and workers must actively enter politics, carry influence, and prevent state affairs from being left to temporary governments and election riggers.

Despite the crisis, Portugal retains significant economic capacity that can be mobilized through moral reform and strong party organization.

Only governments built on morality and supported by coherent parties offer hope; otherwise Portugal faces death through bankruptcy or subjugation to Spain.