II - Ignorance of Rights and Responsibilities

The author asserts that Portugal's citizens lack clear notions of their constitutional rights and the moral responsibilities that accompany them, which they owe not just to the majority but to all Portuguese citizens and to public prosperity, law, and history.

The author establishes that the Constitutional Charter of the monarchy is the sole legal vehicle for all political activity in the nation.

The author questions how few Portuguese citizens, despite millions in the nation, have direct knowledge of the Constitutional Charter that cost rivers of blood and mountains of gold to obtain.

The author explains that the Portuguese people, oppressed for centuries by imposed ignorance serving confessional and court politics, are only slowly transitioning from passive material existence toward the moral and democratic realm of modern society.

The author explains that the people know the constitution only through practice, and since practice has not faithfully reflected original theory, the nation after thirty-three years still fails to comprehend the full scope of powers granted by representative government.

The author laments that the sources of example—the guides, mirrors, and masters for the people—have not provided the purest moral guidance.

The author defines the moderating power held by the head of state at the apex of the governmental structure, noting it should be removed from partisan passions and arbitrary ministerial changes.

The author asserts that though the king is irresponsible, this condition stems solely from a constitutional article and is not inherent to the crown, meaning it ceases when the constitution is suspended.

The author argues that during the suspension of the constitution by dictatorship, one may legally reference an important act of personal royal responsibility that occurred in May without violating law.

The author narrates the invasion of the royal palace by four hundred soldiers, the shooting of victims, the Duke of Saldanha's demand for ministerial resignation, and the king's concession of dictatorship to avoid civil conflict.

The author catalogs three specific rights of the crown that were violated in the May incident: free choice of responsible counselors, power to adjourn or dissolve the chamber, and power to pardon.

The author defines the primary right of the legislative power as making laws subject to royal sanction, whether from government proposals or individual parliamentary initiative.

The author criticizes the legislative chambers for lacking the energy to properly oversee rights and debate private member initiatives on matters of general interest, reducing such proposals to empty guarantees.

The author notes that except for trivial local matters, few important projects originating from deputies or peers reach the state council, demonstrating how government control stifles independent legislation.

The author defines interpellation as one of parliament's most precious faculties, serving as constant surveillance and a permanent sentinel against legal violations, rewarding good service and restraining wrongdoing.

The author laments that when a deputy poses a difficult interpellation, the majority repeatedly votes for postponement rather than addressing the legitimate question, thereby denying the deputy's right.

The author asserts that the executive power faces equal difficulties exercising its legitimate functions and frequently abdicates some of these functions to public detriment.

The author illustrates how a government's legitimate dismissal of an official sparks public outcry from distant relatives, prompting the 'angel of amnesty' to erase the legal decision despite its propriety and morality.

The author demonstrates how political pressure mounted against executive appointments or resistance to demotion requests forces ministers to capitulate, thereby compromising both law and morality.

The author condemns how ignorance, exploited by politics, incites rebellion against the rule of law, forcing government to respond with force despite exhausting other resources.

The author argues that mutual indifference to governmental and parliamentary rights produces a tragic result: the government assumes a false superiority while parliament treats ministers as servants of patronage.

The author rhetorically invokes the nation's rights, only to be cut short, suggesting that no one speaks for these fundamental national interests.

The author asserts as an inexorable logical necessity that wherever the notion of rights is absent, the feeling of responsibility is equally lacking.

The author maintains that responsibility, when seriously understood, must be treated seriously.

The author criticizes that in reality no one is held accountable because responsibilities are never made effective, with individuals doing as they please if they possess audacity and force.

The author cites an example of a minister paying seven years of salary to someone who never served, an extortion of state funds that was never corrected or questioned.

The author notes the dismissive response 'To Brussels! To Brussels! And the past is past!'—indicating how past injustices are conveniently forgotten.

The author distinguishes between tangible legal responsibility and moral responsibility that originates in conscience and cannot be recorded in law codes.

The author questions what sense of responsibility guides the agitator who, for small payment, submerges citizens' laborious lives in disorder.

The author questions what responsibility influences organized groups of voters who varnish rotting candidates with diplomas.

The author criticizes those who destroy yesterday's idols to fuel the fire of incense for today's victors, questioning their sense of responsibility.

The author condemns the indifferent citizen who, with apathetic distraction, watches the vessel of public welfare sink without a sense of responsibility.

The author questions what sense of responsibility governs the deputy who either debases himself before electors or carries banknotes in his diploma.

The author criticizes the public official in whose hands business matters remain perpetually in pending processes without a sense of responsibility.

The author questions what sense of responsibility constrains the military personnel who sow indiscipline in the barracks.

The author condemns the nation itself for being content in its profound detachment from matters that should concern it, smiling at the absence of all these responsibilities.

The author concludes that while the complete type of society without responsibility has not yet formed, this deficit has spread so thoroughly over politics and administration that its existence will be undeniable except to the willfully blind and deaf.