Chapter I: Prejudices of Philosophers

Nietzsche introduces the will to truth as a fundamental but questionable drive in philosophy, noting that philosophers have never examined why we should pursue truth rather than untruth or ignorance.

Nietzsche identifies the core prejudice of all metaphysics: the unexamined assumption that fundamental antitheses of values (truth/error, good/evil) exist, when these may merely be superficial valuations made from a limited perspective.

Nietzsche argues that philosophical thinking, though appearing rational, is secretly driven by physiological demands and instincts that channel thought into definite paths, making apparent valuations like 'truth over illusion' merely surface preferences.

Nietzsche proposes that falseness of opinion is not an objection to it; rather, the most false opinions may be most necessary for life-preservation, making the denial of false opinions a denial of life itself.

Nietzsche criticizes philosophers for defending prejudices as objective truths while claiming detached rationality, using examples of Kant and Spinoza who mask their personal commitments in philosophical apparatus.

Nietzsche argues that every great philosophy is ultimately a confession of its originator, expressing their moral purpose and deepest impulses rather than impersonal knowledge, with morality being the vital germ from which philosophy grows.

Nietzsche illustrates philosophical malice through Epicurus's mockery of Plato, showing that even philosophers recognize the theatrical and non-genuine quality of their rivals' approaches.

Nietzsche briefly notes that at some point in every philosophy, the philosopher's conviction arrives, suggesting philosophy ultimately rests on personal conviction rather than rational necessity.

Nietzsche exposes the Stoic imperative to live according to nature as self-deceptive: their real desire is to impose their morals on nature, not conform to it, revealing philosophy as fundamentally a will to power that creates the world in its own image.

Nietzsche argues that modern skeptical philosophers rejecting appearance and embracing nihilism may actually be driven by a life-affirming instinct to escape modern positivism and recover older life-supporting ideas, though they mistake regression for liberation.

Nietzsche critiques Kant's answer to how synthetic judgments a priori are possible as circular ('by means of a faculty'), arguing that the real question should be why belief in such judgments is necessary for life-preservation, not how they are possible.

Nietzsche argues that materialistic atomism has been refuted and calls for rejecting the Christian belief in an indivisible soul-atom, while remaining open to refined psychological conceptions like a 'mortal soul' or 'soul as social structure of instincts.'

Nietzsche argues that self-preservation is not the cardinal instinct; instead, life itself is will to power, with self-preservation being merely one indirect result, avoiding unnecessary teleological principles.

Nietzsche distinguishes between natural philosophy as mere world-arrangement and the Platonic aristocratic mode that resists obvious sense-evidence through conceptual mastery, suggesting different philosophical styles suit different types of humans.

Nietzsche argues that sense-organs cannot be mere phenomena of idealism (which would make them their own cause), establishing sensualism at least as a regulative hypothesis for physiology despite its philosophical problems.

Nietzsche argues that 'I think' contains numerous unexamined metaphysical assumptions and lacks immediate certainty; instead of a foundation, it presents the philosopher with metaphysical questions about the ego, causation, and the nature of thinking itself.

Nietzsche emphasizes that thoughts come when they will, not when the ego wills, making the grammatical assertion of an 'I' as subject an interpretation added to the process rather than derived from it.

Nietzsche notes that the repeatedly refuted theory of free will persists precisely because its refutability attracts subtle minds who feel compelled to refute it anew.

Nietzsche argues that 'will' is a popular misconception treating something fundamentally complex (involving sensation, thought, and emotion of command) as a simple unity, and that the appearance of willing sufficing for action is illusory.

Nietzsche argues that diverse philosophers unconsciously follow the same fundamental schemes due to linguistic structure and grammatical functions that govern thought, making philosophy less discovery than atavistic return to ancient patterns.

Nietzsche rejects both libertarian free will and deterministic non-free will as equally mythological, arguing instead that 'cause' and 'effect' are conventional fictions, and that in reality we face only the question of strong versus weak wills.

Nietzsche argues that physicists' claim that nature conforms to law is an interpretation reflecting democratic values, not a text, and an opposite interpretation reading pure will to power without laws is equally valid.

Nietzsche calls for a new psychology that overcomes moral prejudices to examine will to power as the fundamental principle of all life, arguing that psychology, once freed from morality, should become the queen of sciences.